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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION
ENERGY-EFFICIENT AND SECURE HARDWARE FOR INTERNET OF THINGS
(IoT) DEVICES
Internet of Things (IoT) is a network of devices that are connected through the Inter-
net to exchange the data for intelligent applications. Though IoT devices provide several
advantages to improve the quality of life, they also present challenges related to security.
The security issues related to IoT devices include leakage of information through Differ-
ential Power Analysis (DPA) based side channel attacks, authentication, piracy, etc. DPA
is a type of side-channel attack where the attacker monitors the power consumption of the
device to guess the secret key stored in it. There are several countermeasures to overcome
DPA attacks. However, most of the existing countermeasures consume high power which
makes them not suitable to implement in power constraint devices. IoT devices are battery
operated, hence it is important to investigate the methods to design energy-efficient and
secure IoT devices not susceptible to DPA attacks. In this research, we have explored the
usefulness of a novel computing platform called adiabatic logic, low-leakage FinFET de-
vices and Magnetic Tunnel Junction (MTJ) Logic-in-Memory (LiM) architecture to design
energy-efficient and DPA secure hardware. Further, we have also explored the usefulness
of adiabatic logic in the design of energy-efficient and reliable Physically Unclonable Func-
tion (PUF) circuits to overcome the authentication and piracy issues in IoT devices.
Adiabatic logic is a low-power circuit design technique to design energy-efficient hard-
ware. Adiabatic logic has reduced dynamic switching energy loss due to the recycling
of charge to the power clock. As the first contribution of this dissertation, we have pro-
posed a novel DPA-resistant adiabatic logic family called Energy-Efficient Secure Posi-
tive Feedback Adiabatic Logic (EE-SPFAL). EE-SPFAL based circuits are energy-efficient
compared to the conventional CMOS based design because of recycling the charge after
every clock cycle. Further, EE-SPFAL based circuits consume uniform power irrespective
of input data transition which makes them resilience against DPA attacks.
Scaling of CMOS transistors have served the industry for more than 50 years in provid-
ing integrated circuits that are denser, and cheaper along with its high performance, and low
power. However, scaling of the transistors leads to increase in leakage current. Increase in
leakage current reduces the energy-efficiency of the computing circuits,and increases their
vulnerability to DPA attack. Hence, it is important to investigate the crypto circuits in low
leakage devices such as FinFET to make them energy-efficient and DPA resistant. In this
dissertation, we have proposed a novel FinFET based Secure Adiabatic Logic (FinSAL)
family. FinSAL based designs utilize the low-leakage FinFET device along with adiabatic
logic principles to improve energy-efficiency along with its resistance against DPA attack.
Recently, Magnetic Tunnel Junction (MTJ)/CMOS based Logic-in-Memory (LiM) cir-
cuits have been explored to design low-power non-volatile hardware. Some of the ad-
vantages of MTJ device include non-volatility, near-zero leakage power, high integration
density and easy compatibility with CMOS devices. However, the differences in power
consumption between the switching of MTJ devices increase the vulnerability of Differ-
ential Power Analysis (DPA) based side-channel attack. Further, the MTJ/CMOS hybrid
logic circuits which require frequent switching of MTJs are not very energy-efficient due to
the significant energy required to switch the MTJ devices. In the third contribution of this
dissertation, we have investigated a novel approach of building cryptographic hardware in
MTJ/CMOS circuits using Look-Up Table (LUT) based method where the data stored in
MTJs are constant during the entire encryption/decryption operation.
Currently, high supply voltage is required in both writing and sensing operations of
hybrid MTJ/CMOS based LiM circuits which consumes a considerable amount of energy.
In order to meet the power budget in low-power devices, it is important to investigate the
novel design techniques to design ultra-low-power MTJ/CMOS circuits. In the fourth con-
tribution of this dissertation, we have proposed a novel energy-efficient Secure MTJ/CMOS
Logic (SMCL) family. The proposed SMCL logic family consumes uniform power irre-
spective of data transition in MTJ and more energy-efficient compared to the state-of-art
MTJ/ CMOS designs by using charge sharing technique.
The other important contribution of this dissertation is the design of reliable Physical
Unclonable Function (PUF). Physically Unclonable Function (PUF) are circuits which are
used to generate secret keys to avoid the piracy and device authentication problems. How-
ever, existing PUFs consume high power and they suffer from the problem of generating
unreliable bits. This dissertation have addressed this issue in PUFs by designing a novel
adiabatic logic based PUF. The time ramp voltages in adiabatic PUF is utilized to improve
the reliability of the PUF along with its energy-efficiency. Reliability of the adiabatic logic
based PUF proposed in this dissertation is tested through simulation based temperature
variations and supply voltage variations.
KEYWORDS: Low power, DPA, adiabatic logic, hybrid MTJ/CMOS, PUF.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Internet of Things (IoT) is a network of machines, physical objects, people and other de-
vices that are connected through the Internet to exchange the data for intelligent applica-
tions [10]. These IoT devices include smart phones, tablets, smart cards, consumer elec-
tronics, Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) tags, etc. IoT allows direct integration of
physical objects and the digital world to improve the quality and productivity of life. Ex-
amples of IoT systems include smart homes, smart health, smart cities, etc. as shown in
Figure 1.1. Within the past decade, numerous IoT devices have been introduced in the mar-
ket. Currently, there are around 15 billion IoT devices in the market [24]. It is expected that
over 50 billion IoT devices will be connected with each other, creating as much as US$8.9
trillion in annual revenue by the year 2020 [44]. Mckinsey Global Institute reported that
the number of connected IoT devices has grown over 300% between the years 2007 and
2012 [47]. Navigant recently reported that the Building Automation Systems market is ex-
pected to rise from $58.1 billion in 2013 to $100.8 billion by 2021 [1]. All these statistics
show that there is potential for significant and fast-pace growth in IoT related industries
and services.
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Figure 1.1: Internet of Things (IoT) and its applications.
1.1 Challenges in IoT nodes
IoT systems consist of arrays of sensors to gather information from physical sources and
offer the means to establish a network connection to transmit the collected information to
the remote node. This information can be personal health related information such as heart-
beat information, living habits information etc., location of the person or other information
such as temperature, humidity etc. [5]. Based on diverse application of IoT nodes, the main
design concerns include low-power or low-energy designs and security challenges.
1.1.1 Energy constraint
IoT devices are used to sense the phenomena and transfer the information through wired
or wireless sources. Unlike the previous computing platforms such as desktop or mobile
phones, IoT devices are deployed in places where there is less human interaction. Gener-
ally, these devices are deployed in places where there is no easy access to constant power
supplies. So, the power or energy required devices are usually battery operated or uses
energy harvesters to power themselves. IoT devices or nodes are usually small and battery
operated [8]. In other words, IoT devices are resource constrained. IoT devices typically
require long lifetimes, further constraining power consumption. Figure 1.2 shows the max-
imum average power of a device as a function of different batteries and their required
2
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Figure 1.2: Average life time of different batteries Vs power consumption [12].
lifetime [12]. The larger electronic devices with the access to power supply can afford
µW-mW of average power, while the battery operated IoT devices should survive at nW of
power budget.
Technology
Various novel devices, novel circuit design techniques, etc. have been explored by re-
searchers to address the power budget issue in IoT devices. Among the various device struc-
tures, FinFET devices have been widely adopted by industries for the design of low power
IoT nodes. For example, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Limited has launched
16nm FinFET technology for IoT and wearable device applications. Similarly, Intel has
developed a new manufacturing process for 22nm FinFET device technologies. Better gate
control in FinFETs over MOSFETs results in higher on-state current, lower leakage, and
faster switching speed. Further, other nano emerging device based architecture such as
non-volatile memory based Logic-in-Memory (LiM) circuits have been explored to de-
sign low-power embedded hardware. Among the various non-volatile memory devices,
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Spin Transfer Torque Magnetic Tunnel Junction (STT-MTJ) is considered as one of the
promising devices for designing low-power non-volatile embedded hardware. Some of the
advantages of an STT-MTJ device include non-volatility, near-zero leakage power, high
integration density and easy compatibility with CMOS devices [22],[32],[33], [30]. Hybrid
MTJ/CMOS based Logic-in-Memory (LiM) architecture show high potential in designing
low power embedded hardware [90],[73].
Circuit design
Power budget issue in IoT devices can be addressed by employing some of the low-power
design methodologies in IoT devices. Some of the well-known methods to reduce power
consumption in CMOS based devices are sub-threshold and near-threshold logic. In sub-
threshold and near-threshold computations, the logic levels are moved closer to the thresh-
old point of the CMOS transistors, reducing the voltage swing and thereby reducing the
power consumption. However, sub-threshold and near-threshold computation are prone to
high error rates [84]. Adiabatic logic [7] is another circuit design technique used to de-
sign energy-efficient hardware. Adiabatic logic uses power clocks to efficiently recycle
the charge stored in the load capacitor. Because of the recycling of charge, adiabatic logic
has reduced dynamic switching energy loss. Recently, researchers from Stony Brook Uni-
versity have stated that adiabatic logic or charge recycling circuit can be considered as an
alternative computing paradigm to wirelessly power the IoT devices. In adiabatic logic cir-
cuits, harvested AC power can be used directly for computation by leveraging the energy
recycling theory [82], [81].
1.1.2 Security constraint
Along with the energy constraint, security is the other major concern in the design of IoT
devices. IoT nodes usually gather and store personal information. The storage of informa-
tion by the IoT devices makes it a target for attackers to obtain the data. Further, employing
4
Side channel
information
RFID Tag
IoT applications
ONS
Reader
Tag number
Figure 1.3: Hardware attack scenario in an IoT node using side channel information.
the conventional security mechanisms directly in IoT devices are highly challenging due to
their resource constraints. Although IoT device manufacturers are aware of the privacy and
security implications in IoT devices, these issues are either neglected or treated as second
thought. This is often due to short time to market and reduction of device costs through
the design and development process of the device. Few IoT devices that choose to add pro-
tection usually employ software level solutions, where the methods resemble those used
in regular computing [5]. However, when a device is exposed to hardware based attacks,
it will be tough for the manufacturers to update the hardware. So, hardware attack based
countermeasures need to be considered during the design process of the device.
Side channel attacks
There are several kinds of hardware attacks on the IoT device. An IoT device employs
cryptographic algorithms to perform encryption/decryption operations. For example, IoT
devices such as smart cards, and RFID tags are cryptographic devices which are used to
store secret keys and perform cryptographic operations [46]. Hardware attacks can be
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broadly classified as invasive attack, semi-invasive attack and non-invasive attack [46].
These attacks are classified based on the interface that is used for the attack.
An invasive attack is a type of attack where the cryptographic device will be depack-
aged. Further, different components of the device are accessed directly using a special
device. These devices include laser cutters, probing stations or focused ion beams. While
invasive attacks are powerful, they typically require expensive equipment [66],[46]. In
semi-invasive attacks, the cryptographic device is still depackaged. However, in semi-
invasive attack, no direct electrical contact to a chip surface is made. The goal of the
semi-invasive attack is to read out the content of memory cells without using the normal
read out circuits. Semi-invasive attacks do not require expensive equipment. However, the
total effort to conduct a semi-invasive attack on a cryptographic device is relatively high.
In non-invasive attack, the cryptographic device is attacked without altering the functional-
ity of the device. Most of the non-invasive attacks can be conducted by using inexpensive
equipment and hence these attacks pose a serious threat to the cryptographic devices [46].
Passive non-invasive attacks are also referred as side channel analysis attacks.
Side-channel analysis attack is a type of non-invasive attack where the information
stored in the cryptographic device is leaked through side channel information. Side-channel
attacks include power analysis attacks [35], timing attacks [23], electromagnetic attacks
[77], etc. Figure 1.3 shows the hardware attack scenario where the attacker captures the
side-channel information from the RFID tag to guess the secret key used to generate the
tag number and sends to Object Naming Service (ONS) for performing the desired task.
Attacking the IoT node helps to manipulate the data in IoT applications which can lead to
severe damage or property loss to the public. Among all the attacks, Differential Power
Analysis (DPA) attack [35] is one of the side-channel attack well proven in successfully
attacking smart cards or other dedicated embedded systems containing the secret key [49].
Differential Power Analysis (DPA) attack is a type of power analysis attack which ex-
ploits the correlation between the instantaneous power consumed by the device and the
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processed data and the secret key [9] [35]. In DPA attack, the attackers do not require
any information about the actual hardware implementation of the device. Still, the attacker
must know which algorithm to attack since the DPA attack requires a known model of
cipher behavior.
Authentication and piracy issue
Other important security concerns for IoT devices are authentication and piracy [48]. It
is expected that there will be more than 50 billion IoT device in the real world market.
Further, most of the IoT devices are deployed in remote locations. So, these devices must
be equipped with a way to identify and authenticate itself. The second concern for the IoT
device is the cloning attack. IoT devices are deployed in open. An attacker may easily
access an IoT device and extract the secret keys to clone the device. Currently, the secret
keys which are used for authentication are stored in non-volatile memories. However,
the secret keys are vulnerable to active attacks [48], [4], [40]. Moreover, implementing a
tamper resistant circuitry in IoT devices to provide high level physical security may be very
expensive in terms of cost and energy.
1.2 Motivation
IoT devices provide several advantages to improve the quality of life. However, they also
equally present challenges related to power consumption and security of IoT devices. Im-
provement in security of IoT devices comes at the cost of reduction in battery life. IoT
devices collect the real-world data and connect to the Internet. In doing so, they emit sig-
nals known as side channels. Side channel information can be retrieved from an IoT device
during the encryption of real world data. Some of the examples of side-channel informa-
tion include power consumption of IoT device, electromagnetic emission, etc. This “leaked
side-channel information” is related to underlying computation or keys, giving clues useful
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Figure 1.4: Current traces of an inverter implemented using a) conventional CMOS logic,
b) Dual rail CMOS family, c) Proposed adiabatic logic based DPA resistant family.
for attackers to perform attacks known as side-channel attacks. Side-channel attacks on
IoT devices are of concern as these attacks can be mounted quickly on IoT devices with-
out disturbing its operation. Among the various side-channel attacks, the attack by mon-
itoring the power consumption of IoT device is one of the biggest concerns and is called
Differential Power Analysis (DPA) attack. Various DPA countermeasures have been pro-
posed to protect the cryptographic systems [55]. These schemes can be broadly classified
as algorithm/architectural techniques [63], [3] and cell level techniques [75], [15]. Algo-
rithm/architecture techniques modify the intermediate computation steps of the algorithms
to mask the power consumption of the device. However, this countermeasure technique
is unique to each algorithm and does not provide a generic solution. The other counter-
measure is utilizing the cell level techniques to counteract the DPA attack. In this method,
the supply current is independent of the inputs to the logic gates. Some of the well known
DPA resistance circuit family include Sense Amplifier Based Logic (SABL) [74], Wave
Dynamic Differential Logic (WDDL) [75], etc. However, existing cell level countermea-
sures consume more power than the conventional CMOS based circuit which makes them
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not suitable to implement in battery operated IoT devices. In a survey of broad range of
countermeasures against DPA attack, adiabatic logic based countermeasure is considered
as suitable cell level countermeasures to implement DPA resistant hardware.
Figure 1.4 shows the current traces of the inverter implemented using a conventional
CMOS logic, a dual rail CMOS logic and a DPA secure adiabatic logic family. From
Figure 1.4 (a), we can see that the conventional CMOS based inverter has non-uniform
current traces flowing in the circuit for various input transitions. Figure 1.4 (b) shows the
current traces of a dual rail CMOS logic to thwart DPA attack. Though the dual rail CMOS
based inverter has uniform current traces, the peak current traces is higher than the CMOS
logic. Higher the peak traces, higher is the power consumption of the circuit. Further, dual
rail CMOS logic family has uniform current consumption for the input transition from 0
to 1 and 1 to 0. Figure 1.4 (c) shows the DPA resistant adiabatic logic implementation of
the inverter. DPA resistant adiabatic logic implementation of inverter has lower peak traces
than conventional CMOS based inverter and also has uniform current traces. The uniform
and lowering of peak current traces has motivated this research to explore adiabatic logic
based designs to solve some of the hardware security problems in devices where power
consumption is one of the most important parameters in the design.
Along with the low-power circuit design methodologies, various low-leakage emerging
devices have been investigated to address the power budget issue in IoT devices. Among
the various devices, FinFET devices are widely adopted by industries for the design of low
power IoT nodes. FinFET has advantages such as higher on-state current, higher switching
speed and low-leakage. This has motivated us to investigate the usefulness of Finfet devices
in DPA secure adiabatic logic family with respect to energy-efficiency and DPA resilience
property.
Recently, Magnetic Tunnel Junction (MTJ)/CMOS based Logic-in-Memory (LiM) cir-
cuits have been explored to design low-power embedded hardware. Some of the advantages
of MTJ devices include non-volatility, near-zero leakage power, high integration density
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and easy compatibility with CMOS devices. However, the differences in power consump-
tion between the switching of MTJ devices increase the vulnerability of Differential Power
Analysis (DPA) based side-channel attack. Further, the MTJ/CMOS hybrid logic circuits
which require frequent switching of MTJs are not very energy-efficient due to the signif-
icant energy required to switch the MTJ devices. This motivated us to explore a novel
method for designing cryptographic circuits utilizing the MTJ/CMOS device.
Other major hardware security concerns in IoT devices are authentication and piracy.
PUFs are a class of circuits which can be used to generate a secret key for cryptographic
applications to solve authentication and piracy issue. However, PUF circuit characteris-
tics vary with the environmental variations which affects the reliability of the PUF cir-
cuit. Fuzzy extractor based Error Correction Code (ECC) have been used to correct the
noisy PUF responses. Unfortunately, ECC are computationally intensive and consume
high power and area which makes them not suitable to implement in IoT devices. The
other main motivation of this work is to design an energy-efficient and reliable PUF which
can generate reliable key for the cryptographic application in IoT devices. In this research,
we have explored the time ramp voltages in adiabatic logic circuit to design energy-efficient
and reliable PUF.
In summary, this dissertation addresses the hardware security and power consumption
problem in IoT devices with novel circuit design techniques in emerging transistors and
non-volatile memories.
1.3 Contributions
The following contributions are made in this dissertation to address the security and power
consumption problems in IoT devices.
Contribution 1: Adiabatic logic [7] is one the circuit design techniques used to de-
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sign energy-efficient hardware. In a recent seminal contribution [55] that discusses a broad
range of countermeasures and their suitability for ultra-constrained devices, it is concluded
that the adiabatic logic is one of the promising techniques to design energy-efficient DPA-
resistant hardware. However, existing DPA resistant adiabatic logic families suffer from
high non-adiabatic energy loss which reduces its energy-efficiency. In this dissertation, a
novel Energy-Efficient Secure Positive Feedback Adiabatic Logic (EE-SPFAL) has been
proposed. EE-SPFAL achieves energy-efficiency by proper switching of the transistors
during the ’evaluate phase’ of the clock. Further, the information leakage in EE-SPFAL is
avoided by breaking the correlation between the current consumption and the input data.
Basic logic cells such as buffer/inverter, AND/NAND, XOR/XNOR gates are designed us-
ing the EE-SPFAL logic. Further, the security of the proposed EE-SPFAL logic is evaluated
by performing a DPA attack on the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) S-box circuit
which is designed using the EE-SPFAL gates. From our simulation based DPA attack, we
have found that the EE-SPFAL based cryptographic circuits are secure against DPA attack
while further lowering the power consumption compared to the CMOS based designs.
Contribution 2: Along with the low-power circuit design methodologies, various low-
leakage emerging devices have been investigated to address the power budget issue in IoT
devices. Among the various devices, FinFET devices have been widely adopted by indus-
tries for the design of low power IoT nodes. FinFET has advantages such as higher on-state
current, higher switching speed and low-leakage. FinFET is a low-leakage tri-gate transis-
tor which looks promising in the implementation of IoT devices. In this dissertation, a novel
FinFET based Secure Adiabatic Logic (FinSAL) has been proposed. FinSAL has the ad-
vantage of the low-leakage properties of FinFET devices along with dynamic power savings
from adiabatic logic. Further, the basic logic cells such as Buffer/NOT, XOR/XNOR and
AND/NAND are designed using the FinSAL logic. Normalized Energy Deviation (NED)
and Normalized Standard Deviation (NSD) values are calculated to evaluate the security of
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the proposed logic cells. Further, the basic logic cells such as Buffer/NOT, XOR/XNOR
and AND/NAND are designed using the FinSAL logic. Normalized Energy Deviation
(NED) and Normalized Standard Deviation (NSD) values are calculated to evaluate the
security of the proposed logic cells. Security of the FinSAL is evaluated by performing a
simulation based DPA attack on a 8-bit AES S-box circuit designed using FinSAL gates.
Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR) values of the FinSAL S-box circuit implemented at different
FinFET technology nodes are also calculated.
Contribution 3: Recently, Magnetic Tunnel Junction (MTJ)/CMOS based Logic-in-
Memory (LiM) circuits have been explored to design low-power embedded hardware.
Some of the advantages of MTJ devices include non-volatility, near-zero leakage power,
high integration density and compatibility with CMOS devices. However, the differences
in power consumption between the change of spin orientations in MTJ devices increase the
vulnerability to power analysis based side-channel attack in spin device based hardware.
Further, the MTJ/CMOS hybrid logic circuits requiring frequent switching of spin orienta-
tions in MTJs are not very energy-efficient due to the significant energy required to switch
the MTJ devices. We have investigated a novel approach of building cryptographic hard-
ware in MTJ/CMOS circuits using Look-Up Table (LUT) based method where the data
stored in MTJs are constant during the entire encryption/decryption operation. As a case
study, we have designed a non-linear bijective function of PRESENT-80 lightweight cryp-
tographic algorithm called substitution box or S-box and one round of PRESENT-80 cryp-
tographic hardware using MTJ/CMOS circuits. From our simulations, it has been shown
that the proposed implementation method saves significant energy compared to CMOS
based designs along with this DPA resistant property.
Contribution 4: Currently, high supply voltage is required in both writing and sensing
operations of hybrid MTJ/CMOS based LiM circuits which consumes considerable amount
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of energy. In order to meet the power budget in low-power devices, it is important to in-
vestigate the novel design techniques to design ultra-low-power MTJ/CMOS circuits. We
have proposed a novel Secure MTJ/CMOS Logic (SMCL) circuits. The proposed SMCL
circuit saves up to 50% of energy compared to the existing state-of-art MTJ/CMOS logic
by using charge sharing circuit design technique. Further, we have utilized the implemen-
tation method proposed contribution mentioned above to implement a energy-efficient and
DPA secure cryptographic hardware.
Contribution 5: Adiabatic logic has been proposed as a novel computing platform to
design energy-efficient and DPA secure IoT devices. However, IoT devices are employed
in unsecured environments which leads to piracy and device authentication concerns. Phys-
ically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) have emerged as a powerful solution to a variety of se-
curity concerns such as IC piracy, IC counterfeiting, etc. PUFs have shown great promise
for secure key generation for the cryptographic hardware in an inexpensive way. However,
designing a reliable PUF along with energy-efficiency is a big challenge. We designed
an energy-efficient and reliable PUF using adiabatic logic circuit. The proposed adiabatic
PUF uses energy recovery concept to achieve high energy efficiency and uses the time ramp
voltage to exhibit the reliable start-up behavior.
1.4 Dissertation outline
The remainder of this proposal is organized as follows: Chapter 2 describes the background
and a comprehensive literature survey related to our research. In Chapter 3, we have present
a novel DPA-resistant adiabatic logic family called Energy-Efficient Secure Positive Feed-
back Adiabatic Logic (EE-SPFAL) family. The security of the proposed adiabatic logic
family is evaluated by performing a DPA attack on the S-box circuit which is designed
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using the EE-SPFAL gates. In Chapter 4, we present a novel FinFET based Secure Adia-
batic Logic (FinSAL). FinSAL family has reduced dynamic and leakage power consump-
tion as compared to existing DPA-resistant adiabatic logic family. Chapter 5 explores the
novel Look-Up Table (LUT) method for implementing cryptographic hardware using non-
volatile MTJ/CMOS circuits. In Chapter 6, we present a novel energy-efficient and Secure
MTJ/CMOS logic. Further, energy-efficient and DPA secure lightweight PRESENT-80
cryptographic hardware has been implemented using the proposed SMCL logic. In Chap-
ter 7, we present the design of energy-efficient and reliable Physically Unclonable Function
(PUF) using adiabatic logic circuit design to address the authentication and piracy issues.
Chapter 8 concludes this dissertation outlining possible future directions of this research.
Content of Chapter 3 have been previously published in [37] ( c© 2016 IEEE).Content of
Chapter 4 have been previously published in [38],[39] ( c© 2018 IEEE).
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Chapter 2
Background and Related work
This chapter covers the background of adiabatic logic or energy recovery logic (low-power
circuit design technique), Differential Power Analysis (DPA) attack and Physically Un-
clonable Function (PUF).
2.1 Adiabatic logic
Adiabatic logic or energy recovery logic technique is one of the low-power design tech-
niques to design energy-efficient hardware. Adiabatic logic has reduced dynamic switch-
ing energy loss due to the recycling of charge to the power clock. Further, adiabatic logic
uses time varying voltages to slowly charge and discharge the load capacitors. These time
varying voltage sources can be of sinusoidal, triangular or trapezoidal voltage waveforms.
The general idea behind adiabatic switching is to use a constant current source to charge
the output load capacitor [72]. However, it is more practical to use a time ramp voltage
source than a current source as shown in Figure 2.1.
The trapezoidal voltage ramp (Vpc) is expressed as,
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Figure 2.1: RC network charging using a trapezoidal voltage ramp.
Vpc(t) =

0 : t ≤ 0
Vdd.t/T : 0 ≤ t ≤ T
Vdd : T ≤ t
The voltage in the load capacitor is given by,
Vc(t) =

0 : t ≤ 0
C.V dd
T
.(1− e −tRC ) : 0 ≤ t ≤ T
C.V dd
T
.(1− e −tRC ).e
−(t−T )
RC ) : T ≤ t
The energy dissipated in an adiabatic circuit when considering the charge is supplied
through a constant current source is shown by,
Ediss =
RC
T
CV 2dd (2.1)
where T is the charging/discharging time of the capacitor, C is the load capacitor, Vdd is
the full swing of the power clock. If T 2RC (time constant), then the energy dissipated
by the adiabatic circuit is less than the conventional CMOS circuit. By choosing T >>
2RC, it is possible to reduce the energy consumption compared to the conventional CMOS
based logic style. Though, adiabatic circuits have reduced dynamic switching energy loss,
they still suffer from other types of energy losses [31]. Further, it is also important to point
out that some of the IoT devices will operate from few KHz to 10’s of MHZ. For example,
RFID devices will operate at 13.56 MHz. Similarly, adiabatic logic has also found many
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Figure 2.2: Adiabatic charging/discharging.
applications in the design of wireless medical devices such as implantable devices [65].
Adiabatic charging/discharging of the load capacitors is shown in Figure 2.2. The F shows
the function to be implemented and F shows the compliment function of F.
2.1.1 Losses in adiabatic logic
Energy loss in adiabatic circuits can be characterized as adiabatic loss and non-adiabatic
loss other than leakage loss [42].
Adiabatic loss
Figure 2.3(a) illustrates the switch model for the adiabatic loss. When the switch (SW) is
turned ON, the adiabatic loss is given by,
Eadiabatic =
RonCL
T
CV 2dd (2.2)
where Ron is the ON-resistance of the switch, T is the transition period and CL is the load
capacitance. From equation 2.2, it can be seen that the adiabatic loss can be eliminated, if
the transition period (T) reaches infinity. In practice, it is impossible to make the transition
period (T) to infinity. So, it is concluded that adiabatic loss is unavoidable.
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Figure 2.3: Switch model for a) adiabatic loss, b) non-adiabatic loss.
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Figure 2.4: Three energy loss mechanisms in dependence of frequency [72].
Non-adiabatic loss
Figure 2.3(b) shows the switch model to depict the non-adiabatic loss. If any voltage dif-
ference between two terminals of a switch exists when it is turned ON, non-adiabatic loss
occurs. Non-adiabatic loss is shown by
Enon−adiabatic =
1
2
C1C2
C1 + C2
(V1 − V2)2 (2.3)
where C1 and C2 are the capacitances of the two nodes connected to the switch and V1
and V2 are the voltages at the two nodes just before the switch is turned ON. For the low
speed operation circuits, non-adiabatic loss is much higher than the adiabatic loss [42]. In
order to avoid non-adiabatic loss, the transistor should not turn ON if there is any potential
difference between the drain and source (two nodes) of the transistor.
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Leakage loss
With the on-going shrinking of CMOS technology, leakage energy loss has become dom-
inant over the other energy dissipation of the computing circuits. In adiabatic circuits,
during each phase of the clock current flows from the voltage supply to ground, leading to
the energy dissipation which cannot be recovered. All leakage mechanisms that leads to
leakage current is given in mean current Ileak. The energy consumption per cycle due to
leakage loss is given by [72],
Eleak = VDDIleak
1
f
(2.4)
where VDD is the swing of the voltage supply, f is the frequency of operation. From
equation 2.4, it is inferred that leakage-related energy dissipation increases for lower fre-
quencies. Figure 2.4 shows the three loss mechanisms with respect to frequency. Figure 2.4
shows that for lower frequencies, leakage loss and non-adiabatic loss is larger than adia-
batic loss. So, reduction of leakage loss and non-adiabatic loss in adiabatic circuits for low
speed circuits increases the energy efficiency.
2.1.2 Information leakage in low-power adiabatic logic
There are several popular adiabatic logic families that are energy-efficient in nature, how-
ever not all are suitable to design DPA-resistant hardware. For example, PFAL (Positive
Feedback Adiabatic Logic) [79] and ECRL (Efficient Charge Recovery Logic) [54] are
the two popular energy-efficient adiabatic logic. However, they are not suitable to build
low-power DPA-resistant hardware because there is a strong correlation between the data
processed and current traces during the evaluate phase. Hence, there is information leakage
[9].
Figure 2.5(a) shows the schematic of the existing PFAL buffer and Figure 2.5(b) shows
the timing diagram of the PFAL buffer. In the T1 phase, input is supplied to the PFAL buffer
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Figure 2.5: a) PFAL buffer, b) Timing digram of the PFAL buffer.
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Figure 2.6: Supply current traces for the PFAL buffer.
and in the T2 phase, the inputs are evaluated and the load capacitors are charged. In the T3
phase, the outputs are held and in T4 phase, the charge is recovered. However, all the charge
stored in the load capacitors are not recovered and C.Vtp charge (C is load capacitance
and Vtp is the threshold voltage of PMOS transistor) is stored in the load capacitors at
the end of the T4 phase. When the next cycle starts, and if the same inputs are passed,
there will be non-uniform current consumption (Figure 2.6) due to the Vtp charge stored
at the end of the last phase. This non-uniform current consumption can be considered as
a form of information leakage. We have to note that PFAL was proposed for designing
low-power hardware. However, our main motivation in this work is to design low-power
and secure hardware, where the information leakage through these redundant charge should
be avoided. Figure 2.6 shows the information leakage in the form of non-uniform current
consumption for the PFAL buffer.
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2.2 Differential Power Analysis
Differential Power Analysis (DPA) attack is considered to be one of the most powerful
side-channel attacks to reveal the secret key stored in the cryptographic device [36]. DPA
attack reveals the secret key by correlating the instantaneous power consumed by the cryp-
tographic device with the input data and the secret key. To guess the secret key, DPA uses
statistical methods and evaluate the power traces with uniform plain texts. DPA requires
no knowledge about the hardware implementation of the cipher and can be applied to any
black box hardware implementation. These features of DPA makes it one of the powerful
side channel attacks.
2.2.1 DPA attack flow
Advantage of DPA attack using correlation co-efficient (also known as CPA attack) is that
the attacker does not need to know the internal hardware architecture to reveal the secret
key. It is sufficient for the attacker to know the cryptographic algorithm which is used
to encrypt/decrypt the data with the secret key. The correlation coefficient is the most
common way to determine linear relationships between data. Therefore, it is an excellent
choice when it comes to performing DPA attacks. Figure 2.7 shows the simulation based
DPA attack flow using correlation coefficient method. DPA steps used to reveal the key are
explained briefly as follows:
1. A set of plain text I is XORed with a set of hypothetical keys K. The resultant value
is passed to the S-box circuit. A set of expected outputs O (cipher texts) from the
S-box circuit (cryptographic component) is retrieved. Let Ii represent an element in
I where i ∈ [0, d−1] and d is the number of plain texts. LetKj represents an element
in K where j ∈ [0, k − 1] where k is the total number of possible keys for a S-box
circuit. For an 8-bit S-box circuit, the total number of possible keys 28 which is 256.
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Figure 2.7: Simulation based DPA attack flow.
An element Oi,j in the cipher texts O is denoted as:
Oi,j = Sbox(Ii ⊕Kj) (2.5)
where Sbox(.) represents the output of the S-box circuit.
2. The power consumption of the different runs of the plain text are recorded. The
known current trace values are written as a vector i= (i1, i2, ..., id), where in denotes
the current trace value of the nth input plain text. During each run of the input plain
text, current traces are collected and sampled. The sampled current trace values that
corresponds to a particular input plain text is given as ti= (ti,1, ti,2, ...., ti,T ) where T
denotes the length of the trace.
3. In the next step of the DPA attack, the hypothetical power consumption model is
created. This model can be either Hamming Distance (HD) model or Hamming
Weight (HW) model. This model is represented by the H matrix.
• Hamming Distance (HD) model: The basic idea of HD model is to count the
number of output transitions that occur from 0 to 1 and 1 to 0. The basic as-
sumption of HD model is that all 0 to 1 and 1 to 0 transitions consume equal
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power consumption and all 0 to 0 and 1 to 1 transitions consume equal power
consumptions.
• Hamming weight (HW) model: In the HW model, the attacker assumes that
the power consumption is proportional to the number of bits that are set in a
processed data value. One of the limitations of HW model is, it is not well
suited to describe the power consumption of the CMOS circuits. So, in this
work, we have used the HD model to perform the DPA attack.
4. In the last step of the DPA attack, each column of the H matrix is compared with each
column of the M matrix i.e., the hypothetical power consumption values for all the
keys are compared with recorded traces at different instances of time. This will result
in an another matrix R which is of size K × T . Each element of R (ri,j) contains the
comparison result between the columns of hi and mj .
ri,j =
∑D
d=1(hd,i − hi).(md,j −mj)√∑D
d=1(hd,i − hi)2.
∑D
d=1(md,j −mj)2
(2.6)
here, hi and mj denote the average values of the columns hi and mj respectively.
The attacker looks for the maximal value for the entry in the matrix R. If the DPA at-
tack is successful, the correct key can be identified by the maximal value that appears
in a row (key) of the matrix R.
2.3 Countermeasures against DPA attack
Differential Power Analysis (DPA) attack is considered to be one of the most powerful side-
channel attacks to reveal the secret key stored in the cryptographic device. Over a decade,
various countermeasures have been presented in literature to counteract DPA attack. These
countermeasures can be broadly classified as architecture level countermeasures, algorith-
mic countermeasures and the circuit level countermeasures [55].
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Architecture and algorithmic countermeasures against DPA attacks are specific to a
particular cryptographic algorithm and so it is difficult to automate the design flow. On the
other hand, circuit level countermeasures are more generic, since they are not constrained
by any algorithm.
Circuit level countermeasure against DPA attack aims to flatten the power consumption
irrespective of processed data and the performed operations. Circuit level countermeasure
against DPA attack can be broadly categorized into CMOS based logic style and adiabatic
logic based style.
2.3.1 CMOS based DPA-resistant logic style countermeasure
A Sense Amplifier Based Logic (SABL) [74] was proposed by Tiri et al. in 2002 to coun-
teract the DPA attack at the circuit level. SABL gates provide the best trade off in hardware
resources, power and security, especially if balanced outputs are provided. However, the
weakness of SABL is that it is sensible to unbalanced loads.
On the standard cell based implementation, Wave Dynamic Differential Logic (WDDL)
[76] was proposed by Tiri et al. in 2004 where the precharge value propagates from the
inputs to the outputs. Its major advantage is the use of a standard-cell flow, which facilitates
the synthesis process. However, WDDL can generate glitches if it is not implemented using
positive functions.
Some improvement over WDDL have been reported as Masked Dual-rail Precharge
Logic (MDPL) [60] which was proposed by Popp et al. in 2005. However, the imple-
mentation of MDPL shows strong data-dependent leakage which makes them vulnerable
to DPA attacks.
An enhanced SABL known as Three Phase Dual-rail Precharge Logic (TPDL) [15] was
proposed by Bucci et al. in 2006. TPDL is proposed to unbalance load conditions, thus
allowing a semi-custom design flow without any constraint on routing the complementary
wires. The limitation of TDPL is that these designs require a third clock phase and has a
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precise timing constraints. TDPL also suffers from area and energy constraint.
Random Switching Logic (RSL) [70], which was proposed by Suzuki et al. in 2007,
uses a random signal to equalize the output transition probability. The main weakness of
this design is that it requires strict timing.
Dual-rail Transition Logic (DTL) [56], which was introduced by Moradi et al. in 2009,
aims at randomly changing the logic values and presenting the desired data at the same time.
However, its effectiveness under Process Variation Temperature (PVT) is still uncertain.
Later, a delay based logic style called Delay-Based Dual-Rail Precharge Logic (DDPL)
[14], was introduced by Bucci et al. in 2011, which uses random insertion of delay to mask
the data. However, DDPL need level converters and requires precise timing.
Though each secure CMOS based DPA resistant logic style has its own advantages
and disadvantages, they all suffer from high power consumption which makes them
not suitable for implementing in secure battery-operated IoT devices.
Table 2.1: Drawbacks of existing DPA resistant adiabatic logic families.
Logic family Drawbacks
Secure Adiabatic Logic (Khatir et al.,
2008) [34]
High area and exhibit current to input data
dependency
Symmetric Adiabatic Logic (Choi et al.,
2010) [19]
Outputs are not stabilized during charge
sharing phase
Charge Sharing Symmetric Adiabatic
Logic (Monteri et al., 2013) [51]
High area and more complicated to design
Secure Quasi Adiabatic Logic (Avital et
al., 2015) [9]
Suffers from non-adiabatic energy losses
Bridge Boost Logic (Lu et al., 2015) [43] Relatively high energy consumption
2.3.2 Adiabatic logic based DPA-resistant logic style countermeasure
Adiabatic logic is a low power technique which can be used to design low power hardware.
Very few contributions have been made in the area of designing low power and secure
hardware.
Khatir et al. has proposed a secure adiabatic logic (SAL) [34] in 2008, which uses the
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charge recovery logic style to design energy-efficient and DPA secure hardware. However,
SAL uses 8 phase clocks which increases the area. Further, SAL also exhibited current-data
dependency which makes SAL hardware vulnerable to DPA attack.
Later, Symmetric Adiabatic Logic (SyAL) [19] was introduced by choi et al., which
modifies the popular charge recovery logic, called Efficient Charge Recovery Logic (ECRL),
to make it secure. This logic uses symmetric discharge paths and charge sharing feature
to equalize the voltage between the output nodes and the internal nodes. This feature bal-
ances the supply current waveforms of this logic. However, a drawback is that the outputs
of SyAL are not stabilized during the charge-sharing phase.
In order to overcome the drawback of SyAL, Monterio et al. proposed Charge Sharing
Secure Adiabatic Logic (CSSAL) [51] in 2013. This logic is implemented with charge
sharing symmetric input logic structure in SyAL. But CSSAL uses twelve trapezoidal clock
sources making their structure more complicated.
Avital et al. has proposed Secure Quasi Adiabatic Logic (SQAL) [9], which modifies
the ECRL logic to make it secure with an additional discharge phase. Though SQAL has
reduced area and improved security over all the presented DPA resistant adiabatic logic
families, it suffers from other adiabatic energy losses such as non-adiabatic energy loss.
Table 2.1 shows the disadvantages of the existing adiabatic logic based DPA-resistant logic
style.
Lu et al. has proposed Bridge Boost Logic (BBL) [43] which is supposed to provide
DPA resistant solution for high speed circuits. However, BBL has relatively high power
consumption compared to existing DPA-resistant adiabatic logic. High power consumption
makes it not suitable to implement in IoT devices.
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Figure 2.8: PUF production using inherent variations.
2.4 Physically Unclonable Function
Apart from energy-efficiency, IoT devices also suffer from piracy and authentication prob-
lems as these devices are employed in unsecured environments. In recent years, PUFs
have emerged as a powerful solution to a variety of security concerns such as IC piracy, IC
counterfeiting, etc[69]. PUFs are a class of circuits that use the inherent variations in an
Integrated Circuit (IC) manufacturing process to create unique and unclonable IDs. PUFs
also play a major role in secure authentication and key management in cyber-physical secu-
rity and IoT devices. PUF can also be considered as a promising solution for authentication
in IoT devices [58]. A PUF is provided with challenge bits (C) and due to the intrinsic vari-
ations in the IC manufacturing process, it results in unpredictable outputs called response
bits (R). The uncontrollable IC manufacturing errors make the PUF response to be unique
and unclonable. Figure 2.8 shows the block diagram for PUF production using inherent
variations. Hence, a PUF can be considered as a fingerprint for CMOS ICs. Moreover,
PUF outputs are hard to predict, simulate or emulate.
PUFs are generally classified into two types namely weak and strong PUFs depending
on the number of challenges that can given to the PUF and the number of responses it can
generate [18]. Strong PUFs have exponential challenge and response pairs which make
them to be used for challenge response pair based authentication. Some of the example of
strong PUF include arbiter PUF, Ring Oscillator PUF etc. Weak PUFs have limited chal-
lenge response pairs which make them useful for key generation in cryptographic applica-
tions [27] [29]. An example of weak PUF is SRAM PUF [78]. As an example, operation
of SRAM PUF is described below.
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Figure 2.9: SRAM PUF cell.
2.4.1 SRAM PUF
This section describes the background on SRAM PUF [29]. Figure 2.9 shows the schematic
of the 6T SRAM PUF cell. The 6T SRAM cell consists of a bistable circuit which has
two cross coupled inverters (M1, M2, M3 and M4). When the SRAM cell is powered,
current will start flowing through M1 and M2. Due to intrinsic variations in the transistors,
the threshold voltage of one PMOS will be higher than the other. So, more current will
start flowing through the PMOS with lower resistance and hence one output will be biased
towards logic “1” while the other output will be at logic “0”. Since both the inverters are
designed to be identical in strength, the output response will be determined by the intrinsic
process variations.
Though SRAM PUF has several advantages such as low-power, high density, etc., the
reliability is one of the major concern in the design of PUF in particular for key generation
application. Cortez et al. [21] has reported that intelligent choosing of time ramp up at
a particular temperature can improve the reliability of SRAM PUF cells. However, this
technique requires additional circuitry to perform the intelligent time ramp up operation to
improve the reliability of SRAM PUF cell. Similarly, Vijayakumar et al. [80] have pro-
posed a majority voting technique to improve the reliability of the SRAM PUF. However,
this technique requires multiple turning on and turning off of the SRAM cell.
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2.4.2 Metrics for evaluating the PUF
This section discusses the metrics used to evaluate the performance of PUF.
Uniqueness
Uniqueness is used to determine the ability of a PUF to uniquely distinguish a chip among
the group of other chips. The ideal value of the uniqueness metric is 50 %. If two dif-
ferent PUF instances (i and j), have responses Ri and Rj which is of bit length “n”, then
uniqueness is given by,
Uniqueness =
2
k(k − 1)
Σk−1i=1 Σ
k
j=i+1
HD(Ri, Rj)
n
× 100% (2.7)
where HD(Ri, Rj) represents the Hamming Distance (HD) between Ri and Rj . k rep-
resents the total number of IC chips.
Uniformity
Uniformity is used to measure whether the number of zeros and number of ones in the
response bits are balanced or not. Uniformity is given by measuring number of 1’s in the
proposed 128-bit PUF. Uniformity is given by,
Uniformity =
1
n× k
Σk−1i=1 ri,l × 100%, (2.8)
where ri,l represents the l-th bit from PUF instance i.
Reliability
The reproducibility of the response bits from the same PUF instance with the varying en-
vironmental conditions such as temperature, supply voltage is given by reliability metrics.
For ith PUF instance, let Ri be the reference response or the golden response recorded un-
der nominal operating conditions. Then, applying the same challenge to the same PUF but
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under different environmental conditions, n responses are observed. Reliability metric is
given by,
Reliability = [1− 1
k
Σki=1
HD(Ri, R
′
i,t)
n
]× 100% (2.9)
where HD(HD(Ri, R
′
i,t) is the HD between the golden response and the response gen-
erated by the same PUF instance at different environmental conditions. In other words,
reliability is the measure of total number of bits flipped between the golden response and
the response recorded from the same PUF instance with different environmental conditions.
The ideal value of the reliability metric is 100 %.
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Chapter 3
Energy-Efficient Secure Positive
Feedback Adiabatic Logic
The emergence of Internet of Things (IoT) have increased the need of Radio Frequency
Identification (RFID) and smart cards that are energy-efficient and secure against Differen-
tial Power Analysis (DPA) attacks. Adiabatic logic is one of the circuit design techniques
that can be used to design energy-efficient and secure hardware. However, the existing
DPA resistant adiabatic logic families suffer from non-adiabatic energy loss. This chapter
presents a novel adiabatic logic family called Energy-Efficient Secure Positive Feedback
Adiabatic Logic (EE-SPFAL) family that is energy-efficient compared to the state-of-art
designs and also is secure against DPA attacks. Energy-efficiency of the EE-SPFAL is im-
proved by reducing the non-adiabatic energy loss. Further, EE-SPFAL is secure against
DPA as it breaks the correlation between the power consumption and the data being pro-
cessed.
3.1 Logic structure of EE-SPFAL gates
Figure 3.1(a) shows the schematic diagram of the proposed EE-SPFAL buffer. The pro-
posed buffer is modified from the Positive Feedback Adiabatic Logic (PFAL) [79]. In
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Figure 3.1: a) Proposed EE-SPFAL buffer, b) Timing digram of the EE-SPFAL buffer.
Figure 3.1(a), M1 and M2 are used to recover the charge from the load capacitors. M3 and
M4 are the evaluate transistors which are used to perform the logical operation. M7 and M8
are used to reset the outputs. M5 and M6 are used to avoid the minimal logical degradation.
In this research, we are solving the leakage of information in PFAL by equalizing the load
voltage before evaluating the next cycle. In this case, we are resetting the output before the
evaluation of the next cycle. Timing diagram of the proposed EE-SPFAL buffer is shown
in Figure 3.1(b).
Let us try to understand the operation of the EE-SPFAL buffer through different phases
(wait, evaluate, hold, recovery) of the clock. Let us assume that all the nodes are at GND
(zero potential) initially.
T1 (Wait phase ): At T1, VCLK is at GND (Figure 3.1 (b)). Input A slowly rises
from GND to Vdd. As we have assumed that all the node potentials are at GND initially,
M3 is turned ON without non-adiabatic loss. M7 and M8 are turned ON to discharge the
redundant charge stored in the previous phase of the operation. The rest of the transistors
are turned OFF in this phase. Figure 3.2 shows the switching operation of the transistor in
the T1 phase.
T2 (Evaluate phase): At T2, the DISCHARGE signal is at GND. A is at Vdd and
VCLK rises from GND to Vdd. VCLK acts as the source node and OUT acts as the drain
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Figure 3.2: Switching operation of transistors in the T1 phase of EE-SPFAL buffer for
A=1, Ā=0.
node for the M1 transistor. When VCLK rises from GND to Vtp, current will flow through
M3 to charge the load capacitor without non-adiabatic loss (Figure 3.3a). PMOS will be
turned ON if VSGp is greater than Vtp. For M1 to be turned ON, VSGp > Vtp.
VSM1 − VGM1 > Vtp
For M1, VSM1 = VV CLK , VGM1 = Vout.
VV CLK − Vout > Vtp
Since, Vout = 0, the above equation can be written as,
VV CLK > Vtp (3.1)
When the clock reaches Vtp, M1 will be turned ON. The current will flow through both M1
and M3 to charge the load capacitor without non-adiabatic loss (Figure 3.3b). When OUT
reaches Vtn, M6 is turned ON and the redundant voltage at out is discharged to GND. M3
will be turned OFF if VGSn < Vtn.
VGM3 − VSM3 < Vtn
For M3, VGM3 = Vdd and VSM3 = Vout
Vdd − Vout < Vtn
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Figure 3.3: Switching operation of transistors in the T2 phase of EE-SPFAL buffer for
A=1, Ā=0. (a) represents the switching operation of the transistors when VCLK reaches
Vtp from GND. (b) represents the switching operations when VCLK reaches from Vtp to
Vdd−Vtn. (c) represents the switching operations when VCLK reaches Vdd from Vdd−Vtn.
Rearranging the above equation, we get
Vout > Vdd − Vtn (3.2)
When OUT reaches Vdd − Vtn, M3 will be turned OFF and the current will flow through
M1 to charge the load capacitor (Figure 3.3c).
T3 (Hold Phase): At T3, the clock VCLK is at Vdd. Input A is slowly decreased from
Vdd to GND. The output will be hold.
T4 (Recovery Phase): At T4, the clock VCLK slowly decreases from Vdd to GND. The
charge stored in the output load capacitor is slowly recovered back to the clock through
M1. The recovery of charge continues until the M1 transistor is turned OFF. In this phase,
the clock will follow the OUT node, as the potential of the OUT node is greater than the
potential of the clock. So, the OUT node acts as the source for the transistor M1 and the
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Figure 3.4: Switching operation of transistors in the T4 phase of EE-SPFAL buffer for
A=1, Ā=0, (a) represents the switching operation of the transistors when VCLK reach Vtp
from Vdd, (b) represents the switching operation of the transistors when VCLK reach GND
from Vtp.
clock VCLK acts as the drain for M1. Figure 3.4 shows the switching operation of the
transistors in T4 phase. PMOS will be turned OFF when VSGp is less than Vtp.
VSGp < Vtp
VSM1 − VGM1 < Vtp
In this phase, VSM1 = Vout and VGM1 = 0 for M1.
Vout − 0 < Vtp
Vout < Vtp (3.3)
When the output voltage reaches Vtp, M1 is turned OFF and the output voltage will stay at
Vtp at the end of this phase.
Charges stored in the output node at the end of the 1st cycle (T1-T4) is discharged to the
ground in the next phase of the clock (T5) through M7 or M8 by using the discharge signal
(Figure 3.1(b)). Resetting the output node to zero reduces the correlation between the
current supplied and the data evaluated.
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Figure 3.5: Supply current traces for the EE-SPFAL buffer.
Figure 3.5 shows the supply current traces for the EE-SPFAL buffer with the load ca-
pacitance of 100fF. It is shown that for the various input transitions, EE-SPFAL buffer con-
sumes uniform current. Current consumption in each phase (wait, evaluate, hold, recovery)
of the clock is also shown in the Figure 3.5.
3.1.1 Energy Analysis of buffers
In this work, energy consumption of EE-SPFAL buffer is compared with a DPA resistant
adiabatic logic called Secure Quasi-Adiabatic Logic (SQAL) family. SQAL [9] has less
area and energy consumption compared to Symmetric Adiabatic Logic (SyAL) [19] and
Charge Sharing Secure Adiabatic Logic (CSSAL) [51]. However, SQAL, CSSAL, and
SyAL logic styles suffer from non-adiabatic loss during the evaluate phase of the clock.
It should be noted that the timing diagram of the SQAL buffer is similar to that of EE-
SPFAL buffer as shown in Figure 3.1(b). During the evaluate phase of the clock, the load
capacitors in the SQAL buffer are abruptly charged to Vtp leading to 2X(12)CV
2
tp Joules
of non-adiabatic energy loss per bit operation. In the EE-SPFAL buffer, the non-adiabatic
energy loss is avoided during the evaluate phase by not turning ON the transistor when
there is any potential difference between the two nodes (drain and source) of the transistor.
For example, in the EE-SPFAL buffer, transistor M3 or M4 is turned ON when there is
no potential difference between its source and drain. So, the load capacitors are charged
without any non-adiabatic energy loss.
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Figure 3.6: Energy consumed in each cycle of CMOS, SQAL and EE-SPFAL buffer.
Figure 3.6 shows the energy consumed during each cycle of the CMOS, SQAL, and
EE-SPFAL buffers. The simulations are performed at 12.5 MHz, the period of each cycle
is 80ns. Each phase (hold, evaluate, wait and recover) of the clock is 20ns each. It can be
seen that during the evaluate phase of the clock (20ns-40ns for the first cycle), the SQAL
buffer consumes more energy than the EE-SPFAL buffer.
3.1.2 Logic gates using EE-SPFAL
Figure 3.7(a) shows the schematic diagram of the XOR/XNOR gate and Figure 3.7(b)
shows the schematic diagram of the AND/NAND gate. Figure 3.8(a) shows the layout of
the XOR/XNOR gate and Figure 3.8(b) shows the layout of the AND/NAND gate. The
logic function of the EE-SPFAL gates are symmetrically built to balance the load capac-
itances. For instance in Figure 3.7(a), we can see that the pull up network of the XOR
logic function consists of two series transistors (M3 and M4) and a parallel transistor (M5).
Similarly, the pull up network of the XNOR logic function in Figure 3.7(a) consists of two
series transistor (M6 and M7) and a parallel transistor (M8). Thus, the load capacitance of
the EE-SPFAL based XOR/XNOR gate is balanced. The logic function of the AND/NAND
gate as shown in Figure 3.7(b) can be designed using M3, M4, M8 and M10. The pull up
network of the AND logic function can be designed by connecting the M3 and M4 transis-
tors in series. Similarly, the pull up network of the NAND logic function can be designed
by connecting the M8 and M10 transistors in parallel. However, the overall load capaci-
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Figure 3.7: Schematic diagram of EE-SPFAL based a) XOR/XNOR gate, b) AND/NAND
gate.
tance of the AND logic function is not same as the overall load capacitance of the NAND
logic function. In order to balance the load capacitance, M5, M6, M7 and M9 transistors
are added. These transistors are connected in such a way that the overall load capacitances
of the AND and NAND logic functions are balanced while the functionality of the circuit
remains the same.
Table 3.1 shows the transistor count comparison of different DPA resistant families.
EE-SPFAL, SQAL, CSSAL, and SyAL are DPA-resistant adiabatic logic families. The
transistor counts are also compared with the CMOS based DPA resistant logic family called
Sense Amplifier Based Logic (SABL) [76]. It is clear from the table, that EE-SPFAL logic
requires fewer transistors compared to other DPA-resistant adiabatic logic families except
for SQAL. However, EE-SPFAL consumes less energy as compared to SQAL due to the
reduction of non-adiabatic energy loss. It has to be noted that EE-SPFAL requires less
transistors as compared to the SABL logic family. Though DPA-countermeasure circuits
have area overhead, they provide resistance against DPA-attacks. In order to reduce the
area overhead of these logic families, emerging nano-transistors based designs need to be
investigated.
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Table 3.1: Transistor count comparison for DPA resistant families
Logic family Logic gate
Transistor
count
per
gate
EE-SPFAL
BUFFER 8
XOR 12
NAND 14
SQAL[9]
BUFFER 5
XOR 9
NAND 13
CSSAL[51]
BUFFER 11
XOR 21
NAND 21
SyAL[19]
BUFFER 5
XOR 15
NAND 15
SABL[76]
BUFFER 14
XOR 18
NAND 18
3.2 Simulation results of EE-SPFAL based logic gates
In this section, we present the simulation results of the EE-SPFAL logic gates and other
existing DPA-resistant adiabatic logic families. Simulations are done in Cadence Virtuoso
using 180nm technology with the load capacitance of 100fF. The parameter Normalized
Energy Deviation (NED), defined as (Emax − Emin)/Emax, is used to indicate the per-
centage difference between minimum and maximum energy consumption for all possible
input transitions. Normalized Standard Deviation (NSD) indicates the energy consump-
tion variation based on the inputs and it is calculated as σE
Ē
. Ē denotes the average energy
dissipation for various input transitions. In general, ’n’ input gate will have 22n possible
input transitions. For example, 2 input gates will have 16 input transitions. σE denotes the
standard deviation of the energy consumed by the circuit and it is given by
√∑n
i=1(Ei−Ē)2
n
.
The calculated values of NED and NSD for the proposed XOR gate and AND gate show
the ability of the proposed logic family to resist DPA attacks.
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Figure 3.8: Layout of a) XOR/XNOR gate, b) AND/NAND gate.
Table 3.2: Simulated and calculated results for XOR gate for various DPA-resistant adia-
batic logic families.
Logic family SyAL [19] CSSAL [51] SQAL [9] EE-SPFAL
Emin(pJ) 0.68 2.3 1.38 0.19
Emax(pJ) 1.98 2.8 1.4 0.2
NED (%) 49 0.92 0.07 0.01
NSD(%) 25.39 0.32 0.01 0.05
Table 3.2 and Table 3.3 show the simulated and calculated values for the various DPA-
resistant adiabatic logic based XOR and AND gates respectively at 12.5 MHz. It can be
seen from Table 3.2 and Table 3.3 that for various transitions of the input bits, our EE-
SPFAL based XOR and AND gate consume uniform energy. NED and NSD values of
EE-SPFAL based logic gates are less than 1%. The minimum value of NED and NSD
values show that the EE-SPFAL based logic gates balance the energy consumption for
various input transitions. It can also be seen that the maximum energy consumption of
the proposed EE-SPFAL based logic gates are lower than that of the other DPA-resistant
adiabatic logic families.
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Table 3.3: Simulated and calculated results for AND gate for various DPA-resistant adia-
batic logic families.
Logic family SyAL [19] CSSAL [51] SQAL [9] EE-SPFAL
Emin(pJ) 0.7 2.14 1.9 0.24
Emax(pJ) 1.96 2.17 2.3 0.29
NED (%) 50.8 1.2 1.8 0.18
NSD(%) 23.32 0.04 0.09 0.05
3.3 Leakage current analysis of EE-SPFAL logic gates
In this section, leakage current consumption of the EE-SPFAL logic gates is presented
along with some of the state-of-art DPA-resistant adiabatic logic families.
Table 3.4: Leakage current of various DPA resistant adiabatic logic families (AND gate).
Logic family SyAL [19] CSSAL [51] SQAL [9] EE-SPFAL
Leakage current
(A=0, B=0) 68.7 nA 64.93 nA 68.1 nA 73.6 nA
Leakage current
(A=0, B=1) 70.5 nA 66.2 nA 70.91 nA 76.9 nA
Leakage current
(A=1, B=0) 75 nA 70.3 nA 72.8 nA 76.03 nA
Leakage current
(A=1, B=1) 69.2 nA 65.42 nA 73.4 nA 76.4 nA
Average Leakage
current 70.85 nA 66.71 nA 71.3 nA 75.73 nA
In measuring the leakage current of the DPA-resistant adiabatic logic families, a con-
stant input is applied to the logic gates. Leakage current for the adiabatic logic gates are the
mean of the leakage current flowing during the evaluate, hold, and recovery phases of the
clock [72]. To the best of our knowledge, there is not much work done on leakage current
consumption analysis of the DPA resistant adiabatic logic gates.
Table 3.4 and Table 3.5 shows the leakage current consumption of the various DPA
resistant adiabatic logic based AND and XOR gates respectively. From our simulation
results, it has been inferred that the EE-SPFAL logic gates consume more leakage current
compared to SyAL, CSSAL and SQAL based logic gates. SyAL, CSSAL, and SQAL logic
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families are designed based on Efficient Charge Recovery Logic (ECRL)[54] family. ECRL
logic family is a differential cascode voltage switch logic based low-power circuits which
makes ECRL family to consume less leakage current as compared to PFAL logic. EE-
SPFAL logic is based on PFAL based logic family. EE-SPFAL has more leakage current
flowing through the circuit due to the additional ground paths associated with each gates.
We have to remember that transistors M9 and M10 in Figure 3.7(a) and M11 and M12 in
Figure 3.7(b) are used to avoid the logical degradation of the signal. Transistors M11 and
M12 in Figure 3.7(a) and M3 and M14 in Figure 3.7(b) are used to reset the outputs to
make the gates more secure against DPA attacks. However, these transistors are increasing
the leakage current flow in the proposed EE-SPFAL based logic gates.
Table 3.5: Leakage current of various DPA resistant adiabatic logic families (XOR gate).
Logic family SyAL [19] CSSAL [51] SQAL [9] EE-SPFAL
Leakage current
(A=0, B=0) 72 nA 66 nA 129.2 nA 136.01 nA
Leakage current
(A=0, B=1) 71.3 nA 65.5 nA 124.82 nA 136.05 nA
Leakage current
(A=1, B=0) 71.2 nA 65.43 nA 115.6 nA 136.02 nA
Leakage current
(A=1, B=1) 72.5 nA 66.2 nA 132.3 nA 136.09 nA
Average Leakage
current 71.75 nA 65.78 nA 125.5 nA 136.04 nA
3.4 Energy-efficiency and security evaluation of EE-SPFAL
logic family
In this section, we discuss the security evaluation of the proposed EE-SPFAL logic. We
have implemented a Positive Polarity Reed Muller (PPRM) architecture based S-box circuit
[57] (Figure 3.10) using EE-SPFAL gates and performed DPA attack on it. It is shown
that the EE-SPFAL based S-box circuit is more energy-efficient compared to the existing
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Figure 3.9: 4-phase clocks used to build complex circuit using EE-SPFAL logic.
DPA-resistant adiabatic logic and non-adiabatic logic families and is resistant against DPA
attack. We have also implemented first round of AES algorithm using EE-SPFAL gates.
3.4.1 Implementation of PPRM based S-box circuit using EE-SPFAL
logic
In a cryptographic algorithm such as Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [61], the S-box
is the key component for the encryption/decryption operations. S-box is a single non-linear
hardware block which performs non-linear operation in the AES algorithm. In the AES
algorithm, the input byte (8-bits) is replaced by the output of the S-box circuit. However,
the S-box is prone to DPA attacks due to its huge power consumption. For example, 75%
of the total power consumption in implementing the AES algorithm is consumed by the
S-box circuit [57]. In order to reduce the power consumption of the S-box circuit and to
improve its resistance against DPA attacks, we implemented the PPRM based S-box circuit
using EE-SPFAL logic.
As we discussed earlier, EE-SPFAL logic uses 4 phase trapezoidal clocks to recover the
energy. To implement a PPRM based S-box circuit using EE-SPFAL gates, four trapezoidal
power clocks (as shown in Figure 3.9) which are 90 degrees in advance of each other is
employed. Each stage of the S-box circuit is connected to the power clock which has one
phase latency with respect to its previous stage. The output of EE-SPFAL logic is valid
after one phase cycle of the clock. So, in the implementation of the S-box circuit using
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Figure 3.10: A Positive Polarity Reed Muller (PPRM) architecture based S-box circuit.
[57]
EE-SPFAL logic, additional buffers are inserted to synchronize the clocks. We used 135
EE-SPFAL XOR gates and 97 EE-SPFAL NAND gates to implement the PPRM based
S-box circuit. 185 additional buffers have been used to synchronize the clocks in the EE-
SPFAL implementation of the PPRM based S-box circuit.
From our simulation results, we found that the PPRM S-box circuit implemented using
EE-SPFAL logic consumes 19.8µW on average at 12.5 MHz and the CMOS implemen-
tation of PPRM S-box circuit consumes 54µW on average at 12.5 MHz. It is shown that
the EE-SPFAL based S-box circuit saves 64% of average power compared to its CMOS
implementation at 12.5 MHz.
3.4.2 Test case for EE-SPFAL based S-box circuit
DPA attack for the EE-SPFAL based S-box circuit and conventional CMOS based S-box
circuit have been performed as described in chapter 2. In our first test case, the key was
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Figure 3.11: A successful DPA attack on S-box circuit implemented using CMOS imple-
mentation with key=33.
chosen to be (33)10. A DPA attack was performed on EE-SPFAL, SQAL, and CMOS
based test circuits. Test circuit consisted of eight XOR gates performing Add Round Key
operation and the PPRM based S-box circuit together. In the real world DPA attacks, a
large number (greater than 100,000 plain texts) of plain texts are fed as input to the crypto
processor. However, in this research, we are performing the simulation based DPA attack
without any electrical noises. Moreover, test chip was not a full chip with other analog
and digital modules of the crypto processor that consume additional current. So, for our
CMOS based S-box circuit, the secret key was revealed using fewer number of traces (512
input traces). We have to note, that the electrical noises present in the chip increases the
number of traces required to break the crypto processor [50]. For our test case simulations,
we consider the ideal environment (without noise) for an attacker to perform DPA attack.
The same environment has been used to design SQAL and EE-SPFAL based S-box circuit.
As seen from Figure 3.12 DPA attack was unsuccessful on EE-SPFAL based S-box circuit.
Further, we have also tested our designs by providing up to 20,000 input traces and we
found that the key was not revealed in the test circuit built using EE-SPFAL logic gates.
Figure 3.11 shows the correlation coefficient values of the hypothetical key guesses for
successful DPA attack using CMOS logic. It can be seen that the correlation co-efficient
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Figure 3.12: A non-successful DPA attack on S-box circuit implemented using the pro-
posed EE-SPFAL gates with key=33.
value is peak for key guess=33. The correlation coefficient value for the correct key is
0.7. The correlation coefficient value for EE-SPFAL S-box circuit is maximum for key
guess=150. The correlation coefficient of the hidden correct key (key=33) is 1.8X10−4.
Figure 3.12 shows that the correct key is hidden when the DPA attack is performed on the
EE-SPFAL based S-box circuit. We have also performed our test with another key. This
time, we have chosen our key as (181)10. It is shown that the CMOS based S-box circuit
reveals the key as shown in Figure 3.13 and the correct key is hidden in EE-SPFAL based
S-box circuit (Figure 3.14). It is observed that the correlation coefficient of the EE-SPFAL
based S-box circuit are very low (in order of 10−4) and have SNR value close to unity. SNR
value close to unity indicates that the EE-SPFAL based S-box circuits are more secure than
the CMOS based S-box circuit.
3.4.3 Analysis of the EE-SPFAL based S-box circuit
In this section, analysis of the EE-SPFAL based S-box circuit is done. Since the EE-SPFAL
based gates are proposed for building DPA-resistant hardware in IoT based devices, secu-
rity and energy efficiency becomes the major criteria for evaluation. The proposed EE-
SPFAL logic uses four phase trapezoidal clocks to recover the charge stored in the load ca-
pacitors. Since we are targeting to implement DPA-resistant hardware in IoT based devices,
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Figure 3.13: A successful DPA attack on S-box circuit implemented using CMOS imple-
mentation with key=181.
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Figure 3.14: A non-successful DPA attack on S-box circuit implemented using the pro-
posed EE-SPFAL gates with key=181.
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Figure 3.15: SNR values of CMOS, SQAL, and EE-SPFAL.
we want to use less number of voltage sources as compared to the existing DPA-resistant
adiabatic logic families. For example, CSSAL based logic requires twelve trapezoidal volt-
age sources to implement the complex logic structure. An increase in the number of voltage
sources increases the area of the chip and the power consumption. Among all of the DPA-
resistant adiabatic logic proposed so far, SQAL logic seems to be optimized in terms of
energy efficiency and area. Thus, we are comparing the transistor count and the energy
dissipated per cycle of EE-SPFAL based S-box circuit with the SQAL logic based S-box
circuit. Table 3.6 gives the comparison results of the EE-SPFAL, SQAL and CMOS based
S-box circuit. Energy Saving Factor (ESF) is a measure of how much energy is used in the
conventional CMOS gate or system with respect to its adiabatic logic counterpart [72].
Area analysis of EE-SPFAL based S-box circuit
We have implemented EE-SPFAL, SQAL, and CMOS based S-box circuit in Cadence Vir-
tuoso using 180nm technology and simulated using Spectre simulator at nominal condi-
tions. The length and width of all the transistors in the designs are 180nm and 2µm re-
spectively. The total number of transistors used to implement the EE-SPFAL, SQAL and
CMOS based S-box circuit is 4458, 3401, 2202 transistors respectively. It can be seen from
the Table 3.6 that the EE-SPFAL based S-box circuit has the area overhead of 102.4% as
compared to the CMOS based S-box circuit and 31.07% as compared to the SQAL based
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S-box circuit.
Table 3.6: Implementation results of PPRM based S-box circuit using conventional CMOS,
SQAL, and EE-SPFAL logic.
Logic
No. of
transistors
(S-box)
Area
(mm2)
Energy dis-
sipation
Energy
Saving
Factor
Conventional
CMOS
2202 0.04 33.5 nJ -
SQAL [9] 3401 0.0723 7.4 nJ 4.54
EE-SPFAL (Pro-
posed)
4458 0.092 2.638 nJ 12.5
Security analysis of EE-SPFAL based S-box circuit
The immunity of the EE-SPFAL adiabatic logic against DPA attacks is validated by cal-
culating the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) for various input samples. Signal-to-noise ratio is
defined as the ratio between the correlation value of the correct key and the second maximal
value of the wrong key guess [49]. Low SNR values show the difficulty in distinguishing
the correct key and the wrong key. In this work we have run simulations for multiple ran-
dom input samples from 500 to 20000 input samples. Note that for the EE-SPFAL based
S-box circuit, for the wrong key guess (key=150), the correlation was close to 6.8X10−4
and was slightly higher than the second maximal correlation 6.4X10−4 leading to SNR
value of 1.0625, which is close to unity. Figure 3.15 shows the SNR values of EE-SPFAL,
SQAL and CMOS for various input samples. It shows that the SNR value of the EE-SPFAL
topology is less when compared to SQAL topology. Low SNR values of the proposed EE-
SPFAL adiabatic logic shows that EE-SPFAL based adiabatic logic is more secure than the
existing DPA-resistant adiabatic logic families.
Energy-efficiency analysis of EE-SPFAL based S-box circuit
The EE-SPFAL based S-box circuit dissipates 2.638nJ of energy per cycle, the SQAL based
S-box circuit dissipates 7.4nJ, and the CMOS based S-box circuit dissipates 33.5nJ of en-
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Figure 3.16: Energy dissipation comparison of S-box circuit implemented using CMOS,
SQAL, and EE-SPFAL gates at different frequencies.
ergy per cycle at 12.5 MHz. Though the EE-SPFAL based S-box circuit has area overhead
as compared to the SQAL logic and CMOS based logic, it saves about 65% of total en-
ergy dissipated per cycle and 90% of total energy dissipated per cycle of the SQAL and
CMOS based S-box circuit. Figure 3.16 shows the comparison of the energy dissipated per
cycle in the S-box circuits implemented using EE-SPFAL, SQAL and CMOS logic. We
have performed the simulations at different frequencies to verify the functionality of the
proposed S-box circuit. Simulations have been performed from 1.25 MHz to 125 MHz.
It can be seen from the Figure 3.16 that as frequency increases, energy dissipation of the
SQAL and EE-SPFAL based S-box circuit approaches the CMOS based S-box circuit. For
the various frequency ranges, it can be seen that the energy dissipation of EE-SPFAL and
SQAL differs by a constant energy dissipation (non-adiabatic energy loss) per cycle.
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Figure 3.17: Implementation of an 8-bit AES encryption circuit [25].
3.4.4 Implementation of an AES encryption round using EE-SPFAL
logic
In this research, we have implemented the first round of the AES algorithm [61] using
EE-SPFAL gates. Figure 3.17 shows the 8-bit data path AES architecture with the on-
fly key expansion unit as presented in [25]. In this architecture, round transformations
are performed byte-by-byte as shown in the Figure. In the 8-bit AES architecture, shift
row operations are modified in such a way that the 128-bit data is broken into 4 four-byte
groups. The output of the shift row module is selected by a 4-to-1 multiplexer. Mix column
is a byte oriented operation. In this work, we have performed the multiplication operation in
the mix column using the Galois field multiplier [85]. In this architecture, all the blocks are
designed using EE-SPFAL gates. The clocks are synchronized in each stage of the design.
Additional buffers are inserted in order to synchronize the clocks. We make sure that the
data is synchronized and fed to the corresponding blocks without any timing violations. In
this design, we have used buffers instead of registers to store data for each clock. Each
bit of the data is shifted after every clock cycle. However, in this architecture the data is
fed each block in a sequential manner which leads to high delay in the output of the AES
encryption circuit.
Round 0 of an AES algorithm consists of Add Round Key operation which is an XOR
operation. Round 1 consists of S-box (Substitute Bytes), Shift Rows, Mix columns and Add
Round Key operations. We have implemented round 0 and round 1 of the AES algorithm.
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Uniform current consumption for various input plain texts
Figure 3.18: Uniform current consumption of the test circuit (Add Round Key and S-box
circuit) implemented using EE-SPFAL logic.
It has to be noted that in 128-bit encryption AES algorithm, round 1 is repeated 9 times
to encrypt the data. So, in this research, we are considering the power consumption of
the single round of the AES algorithm as the other rounds consume the same amount of
power as the first round except for the last round. Since EE-SPFAL logic counteracts
DPA attacks at circuit level, it is expected that any complex algorithm implemented using
EE-SPFAL logic will consume uniform current irrespective of the data being processed.
As an illustrative example, we have shown the current consumption of round 1 of the AES
algorithm. From the simulation results, we can see that the test circuit (Add Round Key and
S-box) consumes uniform current of 0.68 mA (Figure 3.18) and AES round 1 implemented
using EE-SPFAL logic consumes uniform current of 4.2 mA (SPICE simulation result)
irrespective of data being processed as shown in Figure 3.19.
3.4.5 Summary
We have proposed a novel DPA-resistant adiabatic logic family called Energy-Efficient Se-
cure Positive Feedback Adiabatic Logic (EE-SPFAL). Non-adiabatic energy loss is dom-
inant in adiabatic circuits for low speed circuits. EE-SPFAL reduces the non-adiabatic
energy loss by proper switching of the transistor such that whenever a transistor turns ON,
there is no potential difference between the two operating nodes. Further, EE-SPFAL is se-
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Uniform current consumption for various input plain texts
Figure 3.19: Uniform current consumption of AES round 1 implemented using EE-SPFAL
logic.
cure against DPA as it breaks the correlation between the power consumption and the data
processed. The security of EE-SPFAL against DPA attacks is validated by implementing a
AES S-box circuit and performing DPA attacks through SPICE simulations. As EE-SPFAL
is energy-efficient and secure against DPA attacks, the cryptographic circuits based on it
can be employed in IoT based portable electronic devices.
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Chapter 4
FinSAL: FinFET Based Secure
Adiabatic Logic
Along with the low-power circuit design methodologies, various low-leakage emerging
devices has been investigated to address the power budget issue in IoT devices. Among
the various devices, FinFET devices are widely adopted by industries for the design of low
power IoT nodes. FinFET has advantages such as higher on-state current, higher switching
speed and low-leakage. So, in this chapter, we have investigated the usefulness of FinFET
device along with adiabatic logic and we have proposed a novel FinFET based Secure
Adiabatic Logic (FinSAL) to address the power budget and DPA attack problem in IoT
devices.
4.1 FinFET device
FinFET has a three dimensional structure which has a thin silicon body perpendicular to
the plane of the wafer. The channel of the FinFET is wrapped by the gate in all three
directions. Figure 4.1(a) shows the three dimensional structure of the FinFET device. Fin-
FET provides strong gate control over channels. Strong gate control over channels reduces
the short-channel effects, threshold current, and gate-dielectric leakage current compared
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Figure 4.1: (a) Three dimensional structure of SG mode FinFET, (b) Symbols of SG mode
FinFET.
to MOSFETs [28]. Better gate control in FinFETs over MOSFETs results in higher on-
state current, lower leakage, and faster switching speed. Multi-gate structure of FinFET
allows for different working modes of FinFET. The two main working modes for FinFET
are Shorted-Gate (SG) mode and Independent-Gate (IG) mode.
4.1.1 Shorted-Gate (SG) mode
In the Shorted Gate (SG) mode, double gate (back gate and front gate) of the FinFET are
tied together. FinFET acts as a three terminal device in SG mode. Figure 4.1(b) shows the
symbols of SG mode FinFET.
4.1.2 Independent-Gate (IG) mode
In the Independent Gate (IG) mode, top part of the gate is removed to form two independent
gates. The front gate and back gate are connected to two different inputs. FinFET acts as
a four terminal device in IG mode. The special case of IG mode to reduce the threshold
leakage is called as Low-Power (LP) mode.
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Figure 4.2: a) Schematic diagram of FinSAL buffer, b) Timing diagram for FinSAL buffer.
4.2 Logic structure of FinSAL gates
This section explains the logic structure of proposed FinFET based Secure Adiabatic Logic
(FinSAL). In this research, we have investigated the FinSAL in SG mode type. SG mode
can be considered a replacement to bulk CMOS without changing the configuration of
existing circuits.
The proposed FinFET based Secure Adiabatic Logic (FinSAL) buffer is depicted in
Figure 4.2(a). Input and output signals shown in Figure 4.2(b) demonstrate the logic oper-
ation.
The working of the FinSAL buffer is explained through different phases of the clock
(wait, evaluate, hold, recovery).
T1 (Wait phase)
In this phase, the power clock VCLK is stable at GND (low level). The evaluation path
signal is established by A or A (M3 or M4) (Figure 4.2(a)). In this case (Figure 4.2(b)), A
slowly rises from 0 to Vdd which leads M3 to turn ON. The DISCHARGE signal is high
(Vdd) in this phase to discharge the load capacitances through M5 or M6. The redundant
charge stored in load capacitances are discharged to GND before the logic function is eval-
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uated. Discharging the load capacitors before the evaluation of logic function prevents the
circuit from depending on previous input data.
T2 (Evaluate phase)
In this phase, DISCHARGE signal is stable at GND (low level) which turns OFF M5 or
M6. The power clock slowly rises from 0 to Vdd which leads to flow of current through the
evaluate transistors (M3 or M4). In this case (Figure 4.2(b)), when VCLK rises from 0 to
Vdd, and the current flow through M3 which leads to the output load capacitor (OUT) to be
charged.
T3 (Hold phase)
During the hold phase, the current active input signal is slowly decreased to low level
(GND). The power clock VCLK is stable at high level (Vdd). The output signal remains
stable in this phase. In this case (Figure 4.2(b)), A slowly decreases from Vdd to 0. The
OUT is stable at high level (Vdd).
T4 (Recovery phase)
During the recovery phase, the power clock VCLK slowly decreases from Vdd to 0. The
current active output discharges to a low level through M1 or M2. The charge stored in
the active output load capacitor is discharged to VCLK through M1 or M2. Consequently,
charge recovery happens in every clock cycle (T1-T4). Recovering the charge in every
clock cycle minimizes the energy lost. In this case (Figure 4.2(b)), charge stored in the
output load capacitor (OUT) is recovered back to VCLK through M1.
Power clocks required for this circuit is generated by a dedicated circuit. Examples of
such adiabatic clock generation circuitry are explained in [87].
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Figure 4.3: FinSAL XOR/XNOR gate.
4.3 FinSAL based logic gates
Figure 4.3 shows the schematic diagram of the FinSAL XOR/XNOR gate. In FinSAL
XOR/XNOR gate, M1 and M2 transistors are used to recover the charge stored in the load
capacitors to the power clock VCLK. M9 and M10 are used to discharge the redundant
charge stored in the load capacitors before the evaluation of next phase inputs. Rest of
the transistors are used for the evaluation of XOR/XNOR logic function. Figure 4.4 vali-
dates with an example of FinSAL XOR/XNOR gate that the proposed FinSAL gates have
minimum output distortion which make them less vulnerable to DPA attack.
Figure 4.5 shows the schematic diagram of the FinSAL AND/NAND gate. In FinSAL
AND/NAND gate, M1 and M2 transistors are used to recover the charge to the power
clock VCLK. M13 and M14 are used to discharge the redundant charge stored in the load
capacitors before the evaluation of next phase inputs. Rest of the transistors are used for
the evaluation of AND/NAND logic function.
The intrinsic capacitance of the FinSAL based logic gates could play a critical role
in the DPA resistance of the cryptographic circuits. This is because the unequal intrisic
capacitances of the dual rail logic functions coupled with unbalanced load capacitances
could produce non-uniform current consumption which can be easily observed through the
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Figure 4.4: Input and output waveforms of FinSAL XOR gate.
output waveform. In this work, the security of the FinSAL based circuits are ensured by
balancing the current consumption of the FinSAL based logic gates through proper gate
sizing and manual layout of the circuit nodes. Current consumption in FinSAL based logic
gates are balanced by balancing the load capacitances of the logic gates. For instance, the
load capacitance of the FinSAL XOR/XNOR gate is balanced. The pull up network of the
XOR logic function consists of two series transistors (M3 and M4) and a parallel transistor
(M5). Similarly, the pull up network of the XNOR logic function consists of two series
transistors (M6 and M7) and a parallel transistor (M8). Thus, the load capacitance of the
FinSAL XOR/XNOR gate is balanced. The pull up network of the AND logic function
can be designed by connecting the M3 and M4 transistors in series. Similarly, the pull
up network of the NAND logic function can be designed by connecting the M8 and M10
transistors in parallel. But, the overall load capacitance of the AND logic function is not
same as the overall load capacitance of the NAND logic function. In order to balance
the load capacitance, M5, M6, M7 and M9 transistors are added. These transistors are
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Figure 4.5: FinSAL AND/NAND gate.
connected in such a way (as shown in Figure 4.5) that the overall load capacitances of the
AND and NAND logic functions are balanced while the functionality of the circuit remains
the same.
4.3.1 Current consumption of adiabatic FinSAL XOR gate and Fin-
FET based conventional XOR gate
Figure 4.6 shows the current consumed by the FinFET based conventional XOR gate with
the load capacitor of 1fF. The current consumption of the FinFET based conventional XOR
gate is not uniform. This can make the circuit vulnerable to DPA attack. Figure 4.7(a)
shows the current consumed by the FinSAL XOR gate with equal size FinFETs. With
equal size FinFETs, for each input transition peak current consumed by the FinSAL XOR
gate is uniform. However, the current consumed during the hold phase of the clock is not
uniform (Figure 4.7(a)). This non-uniform current consumption during the hold phase of
the clock can make the circuit vulnerable to DPA attack.
To remove the DPA vulnerability during hold phase of the FinSAL gates, proper sizing
of FinFETs are needed. Therefore, in FinSAL logic gates, discharging transistors are sized
2X that of the other FinFETs. Doubling the size of the discharge FinFETs balance the
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Figure 4.6: Current consumption of conventional XOR gate implemented in FinFET tech-
nology.
load capacitances. FinFETs have higher intrinsic capacitance than the MOSFET at same
technology node. So, increase in the size of the discharge transistors helps to discharge
the redundant charge before the evaluation of next cycle. Figure 4.7(b) shows the uniform
current consumption of the FinSAL XOR with properly sized FinFETs. With doubling the
size of the discharge FinFETs, current-data dependency at the hold phase is eliminated.
4.3.2 Energy consumption of FinSAL XOR gate
Figure 4.8 shows the energy consumed during each cycle of the adiabatic FinSAL and
FinFET based conventional XOR gate. It can be seen that the FinFET based conventional
XOR gate suffers from dynamic switching energy loss whenever there is a input transition.
In the proposed adiabatic FinSAL XOR gate, there is a small energy loss during the reset of
outputs. But the proposed adiabatic FinSAL XOR gate consumes less energy as compared
to the FinFET based conventional XOR gate due to recovery of charge in each phase of
clock cycle.
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Figure 4.7: Current consumption of proposed FinSAL XOR gate for various input transi-
tions with (a) all FinFETs are equally sized, (b) 2X effective width of discharge FinFETs.
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Figure 4.8: Energy consumption comparison between FinSAL and conventional FinFET
based XOR gates.
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4.4 Simulation result of FinSAL based logic gates (20nm
FinFET)
In this section, we present the simulation results of the proposed FinSAL based logic gates.
The simulations are done in Cadence Virtuoso using Spectre simulator. Simulations are
based on Predictive Technology Model (PTM) for 20nm FinFETs with the load capacitance
of 1fF. Table 4.1 provides the 20nm FinFET technology parameters which are used for
simulation. In the proposed designs, the size of the FinFETs are chosen to be minimum.
Effective width in FinFETs is defined as 2 × Hfin + tfin. So, for 20nm FinSAL gates,
effective width of FinFETs of M1, M2, M3, and M4 in Figure 4.2(a) is 71nm and the
effective length is 24nm. However, the discharging FinFETs (M5 and M6 in Figure 4.2(a))
are sized 2X than the other FinFETs. In this case, the effective width of M5 and M6 are
142nm. We have increased the size of the discharge FinFETs to discharge the redundant
charge to ground. Increasing the effective width of FinFETs will allow more current to flow
through the FinFETs. So, increasing the width of discharge FinFETs will discharge all the
redundant charge to ground. One key difference between the design of adiabatic CMOS
and adiabatic FinFET for security application is that in adiabatic CMOS circuits all the
transistors are sized equally while in adiabatic FinFET circuits, size of FinFETs need to be
chosen carefully to achieve the uniform current profile irrespective of input transitions.
Table 4.1: 20nm FinFET device parameters.
Technology node 20nm
Gate length (Lg) 24nm
Fin height (Hfin) 28nm
Fin width (Wwidth) 15nm
Oxide thickness (tox) 1.4nm
VDD 0.9V
The parameter Normalized Energy Deviation (NED), defined as (Emax−Emin)/Emax,
is used to indicate the percentage difference between minimum and maximum energy con-
sumption for all possible input transitions. Normalized Standard Deviation (NSD) [15]
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indicates the energy consumption variation based on the inputs and it is calculated as σE
Ē
.
Ē denotes the average energy dissipation for various input transitions. In general, ’n’ input
gate will have 22n possible input transitions. For example, 2 input gate will have 16 input
transitions. σE denotes the standard deviation of the energy consumed dissipated by the
circuit and it is given by
√∑n
i=1(Ei−Ē)2
n
. The calculated values of NED and NSD for the
proposed FinSAL XOR gate and FinSAL AND gate show the ability of the FinSAL logic
family to resist DPA attacks at cell level. Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 shows the simulated
Table 4.2: Simulated and calculated results for DPA-resistant adiabatic logic based XOR
gate.
Logic family CSSAL [51] SQAL [9] FinSAL
Device MOSFET MOSFET FinFET
Technology 22nm 22nm 20nm
Emin(fJ) 0.757 0.352 0.058
Emax(fJ) 0.957 0.707 0.06
Eavg(fJ) 0.865 0.515 0.059
NED (%) 0.15 0.502 0.002
NSD(%) 0.04 0.287 0.001
Table 4.3: Simulated and calculated results for DPA-resistant adiabatic logic based AND
gate.
Logic family CSSAL [51] SQAL [9] FinSAL
Device MOSFET MOSFET FinFET
Technology 22nm 22nm 20nm
Emin(fJ) 0.782 0.356 0.081
Emax(fJ) 0.972 0.706 0.094
Eavg(fJ) 0.865 0.492 0.088
NED (%) 0.15 0.495 0.093
NSD(%) 0.08 0.329 0.034
and calculated results of proposed FinSAL XOR and FinSAL AND gate respectively. The
results of FinSAL gates are compared with Charge-Sharing Symmetric Adiabatic Logic
(CSSAL) [51] and Secured Quasi-Adiabatic Logic (SQAL) [9]. From Table 4.2 and Table
4.3, it can be inferred that FinSAL based XOR and AND gate have very negligible energy
64
deviation for various input transitions. This property of FinSAL gates make them suitable
to build DPA resistant hardware.
4.5 Reliability parameters of FinSAL logic against DPA
attack
This section discusses the reliability parameter of FinSAL logic against DPA attack. In this
section, we discuss the effect of change in load capacitances, number of fins and the clock
on security of FinSAL logic.
4.5.1 Effect of load capacitance on security of FinSAL logic
The difference in load capacitance will result in difference in current consumption of the
logic gates. Difference in current consumption due to the load capacitances result the
circuit prone to DPA attack. So, balanced and unbalanced load test of proposed FinSAL
based gates are performed in this research.
In the balanced test, we have chosen both the load capacitance values to be 1fF and we
calculated the NED and NSD values. However, in practical circuits, due to manufacturing
defects and routing issues, load capacitances of a gate may not be balanced. Unbalanc-
ing of the load capacitances reduce the reliability of the design in terms of security. In
order to address the unbalanced load capacitance effect, we have tested our designs with
unbalanced load with the tolerance in the capacitance value of 50%. In our case, one of
the load capacitance is fixed to be 1fF and the other is 0.5fF. In FinSAL AND and XOR
gates for balanced load capacitances, the number of observations and the energy dissipa-
tion chart shows the minimal deviation of energy consumptions. For FinSAL AND gate
with balanced load capacitances, we can see that the minimum energy consumption of an
AND gate is 0.081 fJ and maximum energy consumption of 0.094 fJ with a energy con-
sumption difference of 0.013 fJ. The energy consumption range of energy deviations of a
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FinSAL AND gate is very small which improves the security of these gates. In the worst
case scenario, with an unbalanced load capacitances,FinSAL AND gate consumes mini-
mum of 0.062 fJ and maximum energy consumption of 0.094 fJ. The range of the FinSAL
AND gate with unbalanced load capacitance is 0.031 fJ. FinSAL AND gates with unbal-
anced gates has low energy deviations. This shows that routing problems in FinSAL based
circuits when implementing complicated circuits won’t affect the security of the circuits.
Further, we have performed the simulations with the unbalanced load capacitances.
Results of FinSAL AND and FinSAL XOR gate with unbalanced load capacitances are
presented in Table 4.4 and Table 4.5. It can be seen from Table 4.4 and Table 4.5 that for
unbalanced load capacitances, FinSAL AND gate and FinSAL XOR gate have NED and
NSD values less than 1%. Energy consumption, NED and NSD values of proposed FinSAL
gates with balanced and unbalanced load capacitances show that FinSAL based logic gates
can be used to design low-power, secure and miniaturized IoT devices.
Table 4.4: Simulated and calculated results for balanced and unbalanced FinSAL AND
gates.
Logic family FinSAL (balanced) FinSAL (unbalanced)
Technology 20nm 20nm
Emin(fJ) 0.081 0.062
Emax(fJ) 0.094 0.094
Eavg(fJ) 0.088 0.081
NED (%) 0.133 0.342
NSD(%) 0.034 0.119
4.5.2 Effect of number of Fins on security of FinSAL logic
FinFETs have unique parameters compared to classical CMOS such as number of fins,
thickness and height of fins. The thickness and the height of the fins are defined by the
technology node, however the designer has the control over number of fins to improve the
performance and the power characteristics of the design. Therefore, evaluation of FinSAL
logic with respect to number of fins is performed. The size of the FinFET is defined by the
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Table 4.5: Simulated and calculated results for balanced and unbalanced FinSAL XOR
gates.
Logic family FinSAL (balanced) FinSAL (unbalanced)
Technology 20nm 20nm
Emin(fJ) 0.058 0.036
Emax(fJ) 0.06 0.06
Eavg(fJ) 0.059 0.043
NED (%) 0.02 0.274
NSD(%) 0.01 0.114
Figure 4.9: NED values as a function of number of fins in FinSAL XOR gate.
width and the length of the FinFET. The width of the FinFET is given by n(2hfin + tfin),
where hfin is the height of the FinFET, tfin is the thickness of the FinFET and n is the
number of fins. Width of the FinFETs are quantized based on the number of fins. Higher
value of width in FinFET is achieved by increasing the number of fins. Increasing the
number of fins will allow more current to pass through the fins which results in higher
on-current.
In this research, we have evaluated the effect of change in number of fins on security
in FinSAL XOR gate. As an example, we have considered the effect of change in number
of fins on the NED values. Figure 4.9 shows the variations of NED value with change in
number of fins. With increase in the number of fins, it is observed that there is a slight
increase in the NED values. With the increase in number of fins the current flow through
the FinFETs increases which increase the NED values. Therefore, lower width FinFETs
can provide better security compared to higher width FinFETs with the cost of decrease in
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Table 4.6: Effect of clock jitter and clock delay with the security of FinSAL XOR gate.
without jitter with jitter with clock delay
Emin(fJ) 0.058 217.6 105.4
Emax(fJ) 0.06 218.3 106.2
Eavg(fJ) 0.059 217.95 105.9
NED (%) 0.02 0.03 0.02
NSD(%) 0.01 0.01 0.01
performance.
4.5.3 Effect of clock on security of FinSAL logic
In FinSAL logic, four phase clocks are used to recover the energy from the load capaci-
tors. However, delay in the clocks may lead to glitches which can affect the security of
the FinSAL logic. As an example, we have performed the clock delay based simulations
on a FinSAL XOR gate. Four FinSAL XOR gates are connected in series and the four
phase clocks are applied with clock jitter and the second clock is delayed by 40ns. Table
4.6 shows the NED and NSD values of FinSAL XOR gate with jitter and clock delay. As
expected, FinSAL XOR logic with clock jitter consume high power as compared to syn-
chronized clock. However, FinSAL logic with jitter and clock delay has similar energy
deviations compared to FinSAL logic without jitter. This shows that clock delay and clock
jitter has minimum effect on security of FinSAL logic.
4.6 Evaluation of FinSAL logic gates at lower technology
FinFET nodes
The main motivation of this section is to analyze the security offered by the FinSAL gates at
lower FinFET technology nodes. With the lowering of FinFET technology, Vdd is reduced.
Reduction of power supply reduces the dynamic energy consumption. However, energy
deviation of FinSAL gates at lower technology nodes can be found out by simulation based
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experiments.
Security evaluation of the FinSAL logic gates are investigated at 16nm, 14nm, 10nm
and 7nm FinFET technology nodes. As discussed earlier, NED and NSD values are con-
sidered as the security evaluation metrics for the logic gates. In order to consider the effect
of routing issues and manufacturing defects, we have evaluated all the FinSAL logic gates
with the balanced and unbalanced load capacitances. The unbalanced load capacitances are
simulated with the tolerance of 50%.
Table 4.7: Comparison results of FinSAL AND gate at different FinFET technology nodes
(balanced load capacitances).
Technology 20nm 16nm 14nm 10nm 7nm
Emin(fJ) 0.081 0.061 0.051 0.044 0.036
Emax(fJ) 0.094 0.07 0.057 0.05 0.039
Eavg(fJ) 0.088 0.066 0.055 0.047 0.037
NED (%) 0.133 0.125 0.106 0.103 0.086
NSD(%) 0.044 0.0411 0.0323 0.031 0.028
Table 4.8: Comparison results of FinSAL AND gate at different FinFET technology nodes
(unbalanced load capacitances).
Technology 20nm 16nm 14nm 10nm 7nm
Emin(fJ) 0.062 0.046 0.037 0.032 0.025
Emax(fJ) 0.094 0.07 0.058 0.05 0.039
Eavg(fJ) 0.081 0.061 0.05 0.043 0.034
NED (%) 0.342 0.342 0.352 0.347 0.367
NSD(%) 0.119 0.12 0.126 0.123 0.132
Table 4.9: Comparison results of FinSAL XOR gate at different FinFET technology nodes
(balanced load capacitances).
Technology 20nm 16nm 14nm 10nm 7nm
Emin(fJ) 0.058 0.045 0.0402 0.0354 0.0285
Emax(fJ) 0.06 0.048 0.0408 0.0359 0.0289
Eavg(fJ) 0.059 0.047 0.0405 0.0356 0.0287
NED (%) 0.02 0.064 0.0154 0.0152 0.0141
NSD(%) 0.01 0.033 0.007 0.007 0.007
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Table 4.10: Comparison results of FinSAL XOR gate at different FinFET technology nodes
(unbalanced load capacitances).
Technology 20nm 16nm 14nm 10nm 7nm
Emin(fJ) 0.036 0.028 0.024 0.021 0.017
Emax(fJ) 0.06 0.039 0.035 0.032 0.026
Eavg(fJ) 0.043 0.034 0.03 0.027 0.022
NED (%) 0.274 0.269 0.313 0.329 0.343
NSD(%) 0.114 0.114 0.142 0.152 0.161
4.6.1 FinSAL logic gates at 16nm technology FinFET nodes
Table 4.11: FinFET device parameters for different technology nodes.
Technology node 16nm 14nm 10nm 7nm
Gate length (Lg) 20nm 18nm 14nm 11nm
Fin height (Hfin) 26nm 23nm 21nm 18nm
Fin width (Wwidth) 12nm 10nm 9nm 7nm
Oxide thickness (tox) 1.35nm 1.3nm 1.2nm 1.15nm
VDD 0.85V 0.8V 0.75V 0.7V
Table 4.11 shows the FinFET parameters which are used for the simulation of the Fin-
SAL logic gates at lower technology nodes.
Table 4.7 and Table 4.9 show the comparison results of the FinSAL AND and FinSAL
XOR gates at different technology nodes with the balanced load capacitances respectively.
From Table 4.7 and Table 4.9, it can be inferred that 16nm FinSAL AND and FinSAL XOR
gate with balanced load capacitances (0.8fF) consume 6% and 7% less energy as compared
to the 20nm FinSAL AND and XOR gate. Table 4.7 and Table 4.9 also shows that 16nm
FinSAL AND and XOR gate offer more resistant to DPA attacks with reduced NED and
NSD values. Table 4.8 and 4.10 compare the results of the FinSAL AND and XOR gate at
different technology nodes with the unbalanced load capacitances. From the simulation and
calculated results, we have observed that 20nm FinSAL AND gate with unbalanced load
capacitances offers security similar to 16nm FinSAL AND gate. Moreover, with FinSAL
XOR gate, we have observed that 20nm FinSAL XOR gate offer better security than 16nm
FinSAL XOR gate.
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4.6.2 FinSAL logic gates at 14nm technology FinFET nodes
From Tables 4.7 and 4.9, it can be inferred that 14nm FinSAL AND and XOR gates with
balanced load capacitances (0.7fF) consume 1% and 3% less energy as compared to the
16nm FinSAL gates. Though there is not significant improvement in energy consumption,
14nm FinSAL AND and XOR gate offers significant improvement in the security of the
security gates with NED value less than 0.01%. Very minimum NED and NSD values
of 14nm FinSAL AND and XOR gate makes it more secure as compared to the other
technology FinSAL AND gate. However, 14nm FinSAL AND gate with unbalanced load
capacitance (Table 4.8) offer similar security compared to other FinSAL AND gates. But,
14nm FinSAL XOR gate offers superior security as compared to other technology FinSAL
XOR gate with unbalanced load capacitances (Table 4.10).
4.6.3 FinSAL logic gates at 10nm technology FinFET nodes
From Table 4.7 and Table 4.9, it can be inferred that 10nm FinSAL AND gate and Fin-
SAL XOR gate with balanced load capacitances (0.6fF) consume 2% and 1% less energy
as compared to the 14nm FinSAL AND and XOR gates. Though 10nm FinSAL AND
gate has reduced energy consumption as compared to the 14nm FinSAL AND gate, it
can be seen from Table 4.7 that 10nm FinSAL AND gate have higher NED values than
14nm FinSAL AND gate. Higher NED values results in reduction in security of the 10nm
FinSAL AND gate than 14nm FinSAL AND gate. 10nm FinSAL XOR gate has almost
same energy consumption and offers same security as 14nm FinSAL XOR gate. However,
with the unbalanced load capacitances, 14nm FinSAL XOR gate offers superior security
as compared to 10nm FinSAL XOR gate (Table 4.10).
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4.6.4 FinSAL logic gates at 7nm technology FinFET nodes
With the lower technology nodes, Vdd is reduced which results in the reduction of the energy
consumption. From Table 4.7, it can be seen that 7nm FinSAL AND gate consumes less
energy compared to all other FinSAL technology nodes. It is also shown that 7nm FinSAL
AND gate with balanced capacitances (0.6fF) offer superior security as compared to 20nm,
16nm and 10nm FinSAL logic gates. From our simulation results, we conclude that 14nm
FinSAL AND gate offer superior security compared to all other FinSAL AND gate with
balanced gates. However, 7nm FinSAL AND gate with unbalanced load capacitances offer
similar security as 14nm FinSAL AND gate and consumes less energy compared to other
FinSAL AND gate.
From Table 4.10, it can be infered that 7nm FinSAL XOR gate saves up to 1% of
energy compared to the FinSAL 10nm XOR gate. 7nm FinSAL XOR gate has almost
same energy consumption and offers same level of security as 14nm FinSAL XOR gate.
However, with the unbalanced load capacitances, 14nm FinSAL XOR gate offers superior
security as compared to 7nm FinSAL XOR gate (Table 4.10).
4.7 Leakage power analysis of FinSAL logic gates
With the scaling of technology (sub 100nm), leakage power is known to be comparable to
the dynamic power and is expected to become larger [20]. For IoT based devices, minia-
turization is also an important aspect in the design along with the security and the battery
power. Miniaturization is done by scling the device. In a recent article on effectiveness of
leakage power analysis attacks on DPA-resistant logic styles by Alioto et. al, it has been
proved that the existing DPA-resistant logic styles are unsecured, which means the leakage
power can be used to reveal the secret keys [2].
FinFET is considered as a low-leakage emerging transistor which has very low leakage
power compared to MOSFET due to the double gate control over the channel. In this sec-
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tion, we are analyzing the reduction of leakage power in the adiabatic logic based FinSAL
gates implemented at different FinFET technology nodes. In this work, leakage power is
calculated during the hold phase of the clock.
4.7.1 Leakage Power Analysis of DPA Resistant AND gate
Table 4.12 provides the leakage power of various DPA resistant adiabatic logic families for
a 2 input AND gate. We have calculated the leakage power of MOSFET device based DPA-
resistant adiabatic logic families at 45nm technology. We have calculated leakage power
at 45nm of MOSFET device because 45nm MOSFETs have significant leakage power as
compared to 180nm MOSFET device [68].
Table 4.12: Leakage power of various DPA resistant adiabatic logic families at different
technology for all possible inputs for a 2 input AND gate.
Logic family
CSSAL
[51]
SQAL
[9] FinSAL (This work)
Technology 45nm 45nm 20nm 16nm 14nm 10nm 7nm
Leakage power
(A=0,B=0)(pW)
201.6 129.8 38.3 38.5 36.09 42.3 42.01
Leakage power
(A=0,B=1)(pW)
198.5 130.9 42.8 40.8 37.7 49.6 49.4
Leakage power
(A=1,B=0)(pW)
187.4 154.08 46.3 43.9 44.03 46.49 46.8
Leakage power
(A=1,B=1)(pW)
203.95 154.96 50.9 46.9 39.1 41.8 44.07
Average Leakage
power(pW)
197.8 142.4 44.57 42.52 39.23 45.04 45.57
From Table 4.12, it is shown that MOSFET device based gates have higher leakage
power as compared to the FinFET based gates. MOSFET devices have higher leakage
power at lower technology nodes due to the formation of the leakage current in the short
channel of the devices. However, leakage currents in the FinFETs can be reduced by the
control of double gates. It is clear from the results shown in Table 4.12 that FinSAL AND
gates reduces leakage power dissipation compared to the MOSFET based DPA-resistant
adiabatic logic families.
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14nm FinSAL AND gate has very low leakage power as shown in Table 4.12. 14nm
FinSAL AND gate has 80.1 % of reduction of leakage current as compared to CSSAL AND
gate. 14nm FinSAL AND gate has also reduced leakage power as compared to other DPA-
resistant adiabatic logic familes. For example, 14nm FinSAL AND has 72.45% reduction
of leakage power as compared to SQAL AND gate. 14nm FinSAL AND gate has 11.9 %,
7.7 %, 12.8 % and 13.9 % reductions of leakage power as compared to the FinSAL AND
gate implemented in 20nm, 16nm, 10nm and 7nm FinFET technologies respectively.
4.7.2 Leakage Power Analysis of DPA Resistant XOR gate
Table 4.13 shows the leakage power of the DPA resistant XOR gate simulated at 12.5
MHz. Similar to the DPA-resistant AND gate, MOSFET based DPA-resistant XOR gate
have higher leakage power than the FinFET based gates. As expected FinSAL based XOR
gate shows reduced leakage power consumption as compared to the other DPA-resistant
adiabatic logic families. Similar to FinSAL AND gate, 14nm FinSAL XOR gate has lower
leakage power consumption.
Table 4.13: Leakage power of various DPA resistant adiabatic logic families at different
technology for all possible inputs for a 2 input XOR gate.
Logic family
CSSAL
[51]
SQAL
[9] FinSAL (This work)
Technology 45nm 45nm 20nm 16nm 14nm 10nm 7nm
Leakage power
(A=0,B=0)(pW)
203.01 171.9 35.6 31.63 28.3 27.9 29.5
Leakage power
(A=0,B=1)(pW)
190.50 172.4 35.7 31.79 27.7 30.6 29.7
Leakage power
(A=1,B=0)(pW)
190.75 171.6 35.7 31.34 27.8 30.7 29.6
Leakage power
(A=1,B=1)(pW)
202.30 173.61 35.8 31.78 27.8 31.2 29.7
Average Leakage
power(pW)
196.64 172.3 35.7 31.63 27.9 30.1 31.625
14nm FinSAL XOR gate has 85.8%, and 83.8% reduction in leakage current as com-
pared to CSSAL, and SQAL XOR gates respectively. 14nm FinSAL XOR gate has also
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reduced leakage power consumption as compared to FinSAL XOR gate implemented in
other FinFET node technologies. As shown in Table 4.13, 14nm FinSAL XOR gate has
21.8%, 13.36 %, 7.3 % and 11.3% reduction in leakage power compared to the FinSAL
XOR gate implemented in 20nm, 16nm, 10nm and 7nm FinFET technologies respec-
tively.
4.8 Energy-efficiency and security evaluation of the Fin-
SAL based S-box circuit
In order to evaluate the security of the proposed FinSAL logic, we have implemented a
Positive Polarity Reed Muller (PPRM) architecture based S-box circuit [57] using FinSAL
gates and performed Differential Power Analysis (DPA) attack on it. DPA attack is per-
fomed as described in chapter 2 of this proposal.
4.8.1 Test case for FinSAL based S-box circuit
In our test case, the key was chosen to be (181)10. A DPA attack was performed on Fin-
SAL based S-box circuit and FinFET based conventional S-box circuit. It was found that
the DPA attack was successful on the FinFET based conventional S-box circuit with 512
random plain texts whereas the DPA attack performed on FinSAL based S-box circuit was
unsuccessful. Figure 4.10 shows the correlation coefficient values of the hypothetical key
guesses for the successful DPA attack in a conventional S-box circuit. It can be seen that the
correlation co-efficient value is peak for key guess=181. The correlation coefficient value
for the correct key is 0.78. Figure 4.11 shows the non-successful DPA attack performed
on the 8-bit S-box circuit implemented using FinSAL gates. The correlation coefficient
value is maximum for key guess=231. The correlation coefficient of the hidden correct key
(key=181) is 1.6X10−4.
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Correct key guess
    (key = 181)
Figure 4.10: A successful DPA attack in a FinFET based conventional CMOS circuit.
Wrong key guess
   (key = 231)
Hidden correct key 
   (key = 181)
Possible Keys
Figure 4.11: A non-successful DPA attack in a FinSAL based S-box circuit.
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4.8.2 Analysis of FinSAL based S-box circuit
In this section, analysis of the FinSAL based S-box circuit is done. Since the FinSAL based
gates are proposed for building DPA-resistant hardware in IoT based devices, security and
energy efficiency becomes the major criteria of evaluation. The proposed FinSAL logic
uses four phase trapezoidal clocks to recover the charge stored in the load capacitors. Since
we are targeting to implement DPA-resistant hardware in IoT based devices, we are making
sure to use a minimum number of voltage sources as compared to the existing DPA-resistant
adiabatic logic families. The total number of FinFETs used to implement the FinSAL and
conventional S-box circuit are 3624 and 2202, respectively. From our simulations, we
found that the FinSAL S-box circuit works up to 800 MHz. However, from our simulations,
we found that FinSAL S-box circuit is energy-efficient than its CMOS counterpart up to
400 MHz.
Security analysis of FinSAL S-box circuit
The immunity of the FinSAL logic against DPA attack is validated by calculating the
Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR). Signal-to-Noise Ratio is defined as the ratio between the
correlation value of the correct key and the second maximal value of the wrong key guess
[49]. Low SNR values show the difficulty in distinguishing the correct key and the wrong
key. For the FinSAL based S-box circuit, the wrong key guess (key=231) has the maximum
correlation close to 4.35X10−4 and was slightly higher than the second maximal correla-
tion 4.25X10−4 leading to SNR value of 1.023, which is close to unity. For the FinFET
implementation of conventional CMOS based circuit, for the correct key guess, the corre-
lation value was 0.8 and was much higher than the second maximal value 0.42 leading to
SNR value of 1.904. SNR value of FinSAL S-box circuit close to unity shows that it is
difficult to distinguish the correct key and the wrong key in a FinSAL S-box circuit.
Figure 4.12 shows the SNR values of the FinSAL logic at different FinFET technology
nodes as a function of number of inputs. Figure 4.13 shows the SNR values of the Fin-
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Figure 4.12: Signal-to-Noise ratio comparison of FinSAL logic at different FinFET tech-
nology nodes as a function of number of inputs.
SAL logic at different frequencies. SNR values for each technology node are calculated
as a function number of inputs. In this research, we have passed up to 20,000 random
input samples to the test circuit to calculate the SNR values with each technology nodes
of FinSAL logic. We have observed that, FinSAL logic implemented with 14nm FinFET
technologies have SNR value close to unity. SNR value near to unity shows that it is diffi-
cult to distinguish between the correct key and wrong key.
Energy-efficiency analysis of FinSAL S-box circuit
This section discusses the energy efficiency of the FinSAL S-box circuit as compared to the
other DPA resistant adiabatic logic based S-box circuits. Table 4.14 gives the comparison
results of the S-box circuit implemented with different DPA resistant adiabatic logic family.
In this work, we are comparing the Energy Saving Factor (ESF) of the S-box circuit imple-
mented with different DPA resistant adiabatic logic family. ESF is defined as a measure of
how much energy is used in a conventional CMOS gate or system with respect to its adi-
abatic counterpart [72]. In this research, ESF values are calculated based on conventional
CMOS S-box circuit implemented in 22nmMOSFET. As seen from Table 4.14, FinSAL S-
box circuit implemented with 7nm FinFETs are more energy efficient with a ESF value of
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Table 4.14: Comparison results of S-box circuit implemented with different adiabatic logic
family at 12.5 MHz.
Logic Device
Technology
node
No. of
transistors
(S-box)
Power De-
lay Product
ESF
Conventional
CMOS
MOSFET 22nm 2202 1.5 pJ -
CMOS FinFET 20nm 2202 0.162 pJ NA
CSSAL [52] MOSFET 22nm 8115 0.76 pJ 1.97
SQAL [9] MOSFET 22nm 3401 0.32 pJ 4.687
FinSAL
FinFET 20nm 3624 0.04 pJ 37.5
FinFET 16nm 3624 0.034 pJ 44.11
FinFET 14nm 3624 0.0258 pJ 58.13
FinFET 10nm 3624 0.0242 pJ 61.98
FinFET 7nm 3624 0.0233 pJ 64.377
64.377. ESF value of 64.377 shows that the FinSAL S-box circuit implemented with 7nm
FinFET saves up to 98% of energy as compared to conventional CMOS based S-box circuit
implemented with 22nm MOSFET. With the lowering of technology, maximum swing of
the power supply is reduced which reduces the overall energy dissipation. As seen from the
Table 4.14, FinSAL S-box circuit when implemented with the lower technology FinFET
node saves more energy as compared to the FinSAL S-box implemented at higher technol-
ogy nodes. As far as the other DPA- resistant logic styles, CSSAL consume more power
due to large number of transistors, SQAL consume more energy due to the non-adiabatic
operation of transistors during the evaluate phase of the clock. Reduced energy dissipation
in FinSAL logic as compared to the existing DPA-resistant adiabatic logic families makes
it suitable to implement in DPA resistant IoT devices where there is tight constraint on size
of the device, power consumption and security of the device.
It has been showed that FinSAL S-box circuit has reduced energy consumption as com-
pared to the CMOS based S-box circuit implemented in FinFET. FinSAL S-box circuit
implemented at 20nm FinFET technology saves up to 81% of energy as compared to the
CMOS based S-box circuit implemented in FinFET (20nm). Energy consumption im-
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Figure 4.13: Signal-to-Noise ratio of FinSAL logic at different FinFET technology nodes
as a function of operating frequency.
provement of FinSAL S-box circuit over CMOS based S-box circuit implemented in Fin-
FET clearly shows that FinSAL gates are energy-efficient and can be used to implement in
IoT devices.
4.9 Discussion
This section discusses about choosing the FinFET technology to design Energy-efficient
and DPA-resistant IoT devices. From Table 4.14, it is shown that FinSAL logic is more
energy-efficient as compared to the existing DPA-resistant adiabatic logic families. How-
ever, with the scaling of FinFET technology, security offered by the logic gates is changed.
For example, 7nm FinFET technology have short channels as 14nm FinFET which in-
creases the leakage current and makes the circuit more prone to DPA attack. But, 7nm
FinFET technology is more energy-efficient as compared to the other technologies due to
the reduction in the swing of the voltages. Reduction in the swing of the voltage sources
reduces the dynamic energy consumption.
From Table 4.14, it is concluded that 7nm FinSAL logic is more energy-efficient as
compared to the other FinSAL logics. However, Figure 4.12 shows that 7nm FinSAL logic
is not secure as compared to other FinSAL logic. From the security perspective, we can
see that 14nm FinFET technology offers superior security as compared to other FinSAL
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Figure 4.14: Current consumption of FinSAL XOR with trapezoidal discharge signal.
logic with a SNR value close to unity. Moreover, 14nm FinSAL logic has comparable
energy consumption with 7nm FinSAL logic. From our simulation results, it is concluded
that, FinSAL logic when implemented in 14nm FinFET technology nodes offer superior
security and can be used to design secure IoT devices for future.
4.9.1 Minimization of huge current pulse in FinSAL logic
This section discusses about the methods to reduce of current pulse in FinSAL logic gates.
The current consumption in FinSAL logic gates can be made uniform by proper sizing
of FinFETs. However, FinSAL gates have huge current pulse (refer Figure 4.7) during
the evaluate phase of the clock. This huge current pulse can be suppressed to make the
FinSAL logic gates more secure against the DPA attack. We propose to reduce the huge
current pulse by reducing the adiabatic energy loss. Energy consumption in adiabatic cir-
cuits can be reduced by increasing the transition period. So, one design technique which
we can use to reduce the huge current pulse is by replacing the square wave discharge sig-
nal with the trapezoidal wave discharge signal. As an illustration, we have replaced the
square wave discharge signal with the trapezoidal based discharge signal of FinSAL XOR
gate. Figure 4.14 shows the current consumption of the FinSAL XOR gate with trapezoidal
discharge signal.
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(a)
(b)
Figure 4.15: Current consumption of FinSAL S-box with number of fins a) n=1, (b) n=4.
With n=1, the peak current consumption of FinSAL S-box is reduced approximately by 1.2
times than the FinSAL S-box circuit with n=4.
4.9.2 Impact of number of fins on FinSAL S-box circuit
The size of the FinFET is defined by the width and the length of the FinFET. The width
of the FinFET is given by n × (2hfin + tfin), where hfin is the height of the FinFET,
tfin is the thickness of the FinFET and n is the number of fins. Width of the FinFETs is
quantized based on the number of fins. Higher value of width in FinFET is achieved by
increasing the number of fins. Increasing the number of fins will allow more current to
pass through the fins which results in higher on-current. Therefore, the performance of
FinSAL based S-box circuit is evaluated by increasing the number of fins (n) with a case
study of n = 4. Through SPICE simulation, it is validated that with n = 4 the peak current
of FinSAL based S-box circuit is 1.2 times higher compared to the the peak current of
FinSAL based S-box circuit with n = 1. Therefore, the performance of FinSAL based
S-box circuit can be improved by increasing the number of fins (Figure 4.15). However,
as illustrated for FinSAL XOR gate, the increase in number of fins reduces the security of
FinSAL gates, therefore trade-off between performance and security need to be considered
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while increasing the number of fins in adiabatic FinFET based cryptographic circuits.
4.10 Summary
In this chapter, we proposed a novel DPA-resistant adiabatic logic family called FinFET
based Secure Adiabatic Logic (FinSAL). We have evaluated the security of the FinSAL
logic to implement in secure IoT devices. At the gate level simulation of FinSAL logic,
it is observed that change in number of fins has a significant effect on the security of the
FinSAL logic gates. With the increase in the number of fins, security of FinSAL logic gate
is reduced. However, the variations in Vdd and the clock jitter do not have much impact
on the security of the FinSAL logic gates. Further, the security of FinSAL against DPA
attacks is validated by implementing a S-box circuit and performing DPA attacks through
SPICE simulations. From our simulation results on FinSAL logic implemented at different
technology nodes, it is concluded that FinSAL logic implemented at 14nm offers better
security as compared to the other FinFET technology nodes. As FinSAL is energy-efficient
and secure against DPA attacks, the cryptographic circuits based on it can be employed in
IoT based portable electronic devices where there is a tight budget on power consumption
and security.
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Chapter 5
Exploration of Non-Volatile MTJ/CMOS
Circuits for DPA Resistant Hardware
Recently, Magnetic Tunnel Junction (MTJ)/CMOS based Logic-in-Memory (LiM) circuits
have been explored to design low-power non-volatile hardware. Some of the advantages
of an MTJ device include non-volatility, near-zero leakage power, high integration den-
sity and easy compatibility with CMOS devices [22],[32],[33]. Hybrid MTJ/CMOS based
Logic-in-Memory (LiM) architecture shows high potential in designing low power em-
bedded hardware [90],[73]. However, the differences in power consumption between the
change of spin orientations in MTJ devices increase the vulnerability to power analysis
based side-channel attack. Further, the MTJ/CMOS hybrid logic circuits requiring frequent
switching of spin orientations in MTJs are not very energy-efficient due to the significant
energy required to switch the MTJ devices. In this chapter, we have investigated the novel
approach of building cryptographic hardware in MTJ/CMOS circuits using Look-Up Table
(LUT) based method where the data stored in MTJs are constant during the entire encryp-
tion/decryption operation..
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Figure 5.1: Magnetic Tunel Junction (MTJ) structure with Spin Transfer Torque (STT)
switching mechanism where anti-parallel configuration represents logic 0 and parallel con-
figuration represents logic 1.
5.1 Magnetic Tunnel Junction (MTJ)
Magnetic Tunnel Junction (MTJ) device mainly composed of an oxide barrier layer (e.g.,
MgO) sandwiched between two ferromagnetic layers (e.g., CoFeB) [53]. MTJ device can
have two different resistance states depending on the relative magnetization of the FM lay-
ers. In general, the magnetization of one of the ferromagnetic layers is fixed, while the
other ferromagnetic layer is free to take either parallel (P) and anti-parallel (AP) orien-
tations as shown in Figure 5.1 [88]. Based on the ferromagnetic layer orientations, MTJ
device will show either a low resistance (RP) or high resistance (RAP) characteristic [11].
The resistance difference between the two stable resistance states of MTJ device is given
by the Tunnel Magnetoresistance ratio TMR = (RAP−RP )/RP . From Figure 5.1, we can
see that the anti-parallel configuration of MTJ can be represented as logic “0” and parallel
configuration of MTJ can be represented as logic “1”.
5.2 MTJ/CMOS circuits
Figure 5.2 shows the general structure of the existing MTJ/CMOS circuits. The Logic-
in-Memory (LiM) architecture based MTJ/CMOS circuit consists of a Pre-Charged Sense
Amplifier (PCSA) circuit, CMOS logic tree and MTJs. PCSA circuit is used for sensing
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Figure 5.2: Structure of LiM based MTJ/CMOS circuits.
the outputs while the dual rail CMOS logic tree is used to evaluate the inputs. The MTJs
are used to store the non-volatile data.
5.2.1 Operation of MTJ/CMOS circuits
The circuit operation of the MTJ/CMOS circuit is illustrated with an example of XOR
based MTJ/CMOS circuit. Figure 5.3 shows the schematic of the MTJ/CMOS based XOR
gate. When the clock signal is set to ground (i.e., CLK=0), the PCSA circuit pre-charges
the output nodes XOR and XNOR to 1 (i.e., the output nodes are charged to Vdd). Once
the clock signal CLK is set to Vdd (i.e., CLK=1), the output voltages start discharging to
ground. However, due to the difference in resistances between the orientations of the MTJ1
and MTJ2 i.e., parallel versus anti-parallel, the discharge speed will be different for each
branch. So, depending on the logic inputs, one of the output node will be at Vdd while the
other node will be discharged to GND.
Let’s assume MTJ1 and MTJ2 are in parallel and anti-parallel configuration respec-
tively. Similarly, let’s assume A= logic “0” and A= logic “1”. Since the MTJl is con-
figured in parallel configuration and MTJ2 is configured in anti-parallel configuration,
RMTJl < RMTJ2. Due to the difference in resistances between RMTJl and RMTJ2, the
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Figure 5.3: MTJ/CMOS based XOR gate [26] [22].
discharge current through MTJ1 will be greater than the discharge current through MTJ2.
Thus, when XOR becomes less than the threshold switching voltage of the inverter com-
prised of MP1 and MN1, XNOR will be charged to 1 (i.e., Vdd) and XOR will be discharged
to 0 (i.e., ground). In other words, when CLK=0, transistors MP3 and MP4 are turned ON
and the outputs XOR and XNOR are pre-charged to Vdd. When CLK=1, MP3 and MP4
are turned OFF. Thus, depending on the input to the dual rail CMOS logic tree and the
MTJs, one of the discharging paths will have lower resistance than the other.
5.2.2 Current consumption of MTJ/CMOS circuit
Figure 5.4 shows the current consumption of the MTJ/CMOS based XOR gate. The data
stored in the MTJs are flipped at time T=80ns. From the Figure 5.4, we can see that the
MTJ/CMOS based XOR gate has uniform current flowing into the circuit irrespective of
input A if the data stored in the MTJs are constant. Uniform current consumption of the
MTJ/CMOS circuit is due to the current mode logic property. In this research, we are
utilizing the CML and non-volatility property of the MTJ/CMOS circuit to build a DPA
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Figure 5.4: Current consumption of the MTJ/CMOS based XOR gate where the data stored
in the MTJ is flipped at T=80ns.
resistant cryptographic hardware. So, we have implemented a lightweight cryptographic
algorithm called PRESENT-80 using the MTJ/CMOS based circuit using Look-Up Table
(LUT) method.
5.3 Implementation of PRESENT-80 using MTJ/CMOS
logic
This section discusses the implementation of one round of PRESENT-80 cryptographic
hardware using MTJ/CMOS logic circuits. In the PRESENT-80 algorithm, S-box is one
of the key components for the encryption/decryption operation. S-box is the hardware
block which performs the non-linear operation in the PRESENT-80 cryptographic algo-
rithm. However, S-box is prone to Differential Power Analysis (DPA) attack due to its high
power consumption. In order to reduce the power consumption and to improve its secu-
rity against DPA attacks, we implemented the PRESENT-80 S-box circuit in MTJ/CMOS
circuits using Look-UP Table (LUT) method.
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Figure 5.5: Algorithmic level description of PRESENT-80 [64].
5.3.1 PRESENT-80
PRESENT-80 is a light weight cryptographic algorithm with 64 bit block size and 80 or
128 bit keys [13]. For many of the low power IoT devices and RFID tags, 80 bit key based
PRESENT algorithm are used for cryptographic applications (PRESENT-80). PRESENT-
80 has 32 regular rounds where each round consists of key mixing step, a substitution
layer (S-layer) and a permutation layer (P-layer). A top level algorithmic description of
PRESENT-80 is shown Figure 5.5.
C. Rolfes et. al [64] have proposed three different architectures to implement PRESENT-
80 algorithm. The different architectures are (i) Round-based architecture, (ii) Parallel ar-
chitecture and (iii) a serialized architecture. Among the three architectures, round-based
architecture is optimized in terms of area, speed and energy which makes it suitable to
implement in low-cost IoT and RFID devices. This architecture uses only one substitu-
tion layer and permutation. So, in this dissertation, we have implemented one round of
PRESENT-80 algorithm which consists of an XOR operation, S-layer and a P-layer.
• Add round Key: In add round key, the 64-bit round key is XORed with the 64-bit
round ciper text.
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Table 5.1: PRESENT S-box.
x 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 A B C D E F
s[x] C 5 6 B 9 0 A D 3 E F 8 4 7 1 2
16 X 1 MUX tree
Sense amplifier
Vdd
Data
MTJ0MTJ15 MTJ0MTJ15
16 X 1 MUX tree
Writing
circuit
MTJ14 MTJ14
CLK
X3
X2
X1
X0
Figure 5.6: General structure of MTJ/CMOS based LUT with 4 selection lines.
• S-layer: Substitution layer consists of 16 S-boxes in parallel that each S-box has 4-
bit input and 4-bit output. Table 5.1 shows the input and output of the PRESENT-80
S-box with hexadecimal notation.
• P-layer: In permutation layer (p-layer), a linear permutation is performed after the
non-linear operation from the S-box. In permutation layer, there is no combinational
logic.
5.3.2 MTJ/CMOS based Look Up Table (LUT) circuit
This section discusses the implementation of MTJ/CMOS based Look UP Table (LUT)
circuit. F. Ren et al. [62] reported that MTJ/CMOS based logic circuits do not provide
better energy-efficiency compared to the CMOS based logic circuit when the data stored
in MTJs toggle. In other words, MTJ/CMOS logic circuits are energy efficient when they
are used in applications where MTJ data are minimum toggled or zero toggled. In this
research, we are built the PRESENT S-box circuit by designing a MTJ/CMOS Look Up
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Figure 5.7: Circuit design of the MTJ/CMOS based LUT with 4 selection lines.
Table (LUT) circuit where the data stored in MTJs in S-box circuits are not toggled.
Figure 5.6 shows the general structure of the MTJ/CMOS based LUT with 4 selection
lines. The MTJ data are pre-written in the MTJ by a writing circuit. In Figure 5.6, data
stored in MTJ0 is read when X3=X2=X1=X0=“0”. MTJ0 stores the complimentary value
stored in MTJ0. For example, if logic “0” is stored in MTJ0, then logic “1” will be stored
in MTJ0. The data stored in the MTJ are selected by the appropriate inputs (X3, X2, X1
and X0). The data stored in the MTJ are read by the sense amplifier. One bit of the MTJ is
read from each cycle of the LUT.
Figure 5.7 shows the circuit design of the MTJ/CMOS LUT with 4 selection lines.
Transistors L1 to L30 and R1 and R30 are used to select the appropriate MTJ’s to read
through the sense amplifier. For example, when X0=X1=X2=X3=0, transistors L2, L6,
L14 and L30 are turned ON. Similarly, transistors R2, R6, R14 and R30 are turned ON.
When the clk is in evaluate phase, the data stored in MTJ0 is read through a sense amplifier
circuit.
Figure 5.8 shows the sense amplifier circuit to read the data stored in MTJ. The sense
amplifier operates in two phases of the clock. When CLK=0, both the outputs precharge
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Figure 5.8: Pre-Charge Sense Amplifier (PCSA) to sense the data stored in the MTJ.
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Figure 5.9: Block diagram of proposed MTJ/CMOS based PRESENT S-box
to VDD. When the CLK=1 (evaluate phase), depending on the low-resistance path, one of
the output nodes will be discharged to ground while the other node will be at VDD. This
property of charging the nodes to constant VDD and discharging it to ground makes the
MTJ/CMOS circuit to have uniform current if the data stored in MTJ are constant.
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Table 5.2: Data stored in MTJ in each LUT.
MTJ LUT1 LUT2 LUT3 LUT4
MTJ 0 1 1 0 0
MTJ 1 0 1 0 1
MTJ 2 0 1 1 0
MTJ 3 1 0 1 1
MTJ 4 1 0 0 1
MTJ 5 0 0 0 0
MTJ 6 1 0 1 0
MTJ 7 1 1 0 1
MTJ 8 0 0 1 1
MTJ 9 1 1 1 0
MTJ 10 1 1 1 1
MTJ 11 1 0 0 0
MTJ 12 0 1 0 0
MTJ 13 0 1 1 1
MTJ 14 0 0 0 1
MTJ 15 0 0 1 0
5.3.3 MTJ/CMOS based S-box circuit
This section discusses the implementation of the MTJ/CMOS based S-box circuit. Fig-
ure 5.9 shows the block diagram of the proposed MTJ/CMOS based PRESENT S-box.
The proposed idea can also be extended to any type of S-box implementation. Table 5.2
shows the data written in MTJs in each LUT. When the input X3=X2=X1=X0=“0” is given
as the input to the MTJ/CMOS LUT based PRESENT S-box, then S3=1, S2=1, S1=0, S1=0
is read through the sense amplifier.
Figure 5.10 shows one round of PRESENT-80 cryptographic algorithm. As discussed
in the previous section, one round of PRESENT-80 can be used to implement a round based
PRESENT-80 architecture. 16 S-Boxes are used in parallel to generate the 64-bit output
and then outputs are permuted forming the permutation layer.
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5.4 Energy-Efficiency Evaluation of MTJ/CMOS logic based
PRESENT-80 algorithm
In this section, we compare MTJ/CMOS based one round of PRESENT-80 cryptographic
algorithm with the conventional CMOS based one round of PRESENT-80 cryptographic al-
gorithm. As discussed in Section 5.3, one round of PRESENT-80 cryptographic algorithm
can be utilized to implement the whole PRESENT-80 cryptographic hardware using round
based architecture. The designs are simulated using 45 nm CMOS technology with perpen-
dicular anisotropy CoFeB/MgO MTJ model using Cadence Spectre simulator at 50MHz of
operating frequency. MTJ parameters used in our simulations are given in Table 5.3 [89].
Table 5.3: MTJ device parameters used for simulations [89].
Parameter Description Value
tsl Thickness of the free layer 1.3nm
a Length of surface long axis 40nm
b Width of surface short axis 40nm
tox Thickness of the Oxide barrier 0.85nm
TMR Tunnel Magneto Resistance ration 150 %
RA Resistance Area Product 5ohmµm2
The conventional CMOS based one round PRESENT-80 cryptographic algorithm is
implemented by using combinatorial gates in 45nm CMOS technology. The correct func-
tionality of the MTJ/CMOS based PRESENT S-box can be verified from the transient
waveforms shown in Figure 5.11.
In order to characterize the CMOS and MTJ/CMOS designs in equivalent condition, 32
D Flip-Flops are added to CMOS based one round of PRESENT-80 cryptographic hard-
ware to synchronize the outputs with clock signal as PCSA based MTJ/CMOS circuits are
naturally synchronized. Further, it has to be noted that in our MTJ/CMOS based PRESENT
S-box design, data are written only one time. Once the data are written in the S-box cir-
cuit, there is no need to flip the data stored in the MTJs. The constant storage of data in
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Figure 5.10: Implementation of one round of PRESENT-80.
Figure 5.11: Transient waveforms of the PRESENT S-box circuit implemented using
MTJ/CMOS circuits in LUT method.
MTJs without toggling helps in improving the overall energy-efficiency of the MTJ/CMOS
circuits. In our designs, we have assumed that the secret key stored are permanent and
there won’t be any update on the secret key. However, for applications where there is a
frequent update on secret key, MTJ/CMOS based XOR gate can be replaced by existing
DPA resistant XOR logic families [37], [75].
Table 5.4 shows the performance comparison of the MTJ/CMOS and CMOS based
implementation of the PRESENT-80 cryptographic module. We have implemented the
PRESENT-80 S-box circuit and one round of PRESENT-80 cryptographic algorithm. From
Table 5.4, we can see that the MTJ/CMOS based PRESENT-80 S-box circuit saves up
to 26% of energy/cycle and 28% of power compared to the CMOS based implementa-
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Table 5.4: Performance comparison of MTJ/CMOS and CMOS based implementation of
PRESENT-80.
Design Energy/cycle Avg. Power Delay
4x4 PRESENT S-box (MTJ/CMOS) 24.3 fJ 1.23 µW 402.5 ps
4x4 PRESENT S-box (CMOS) 32.4 fJ 1.72 µW 312.8 ps
PRESENT-80 (MTJ/CMOS) 402.96 fJ 20.65 µW 640.8 ps
PRESENT-80 (CMOS) 566.8 fJ 28.336 µW 484.3 ps
tion. Similarly, one round of PRESENT-80 cryptographic algorithm implemented using
MTJ/CMOS circuit saves up to 29% of energy/cycle and 27% of power compared to the
CMOS based implementation. Though the delay of the MTJ/CMOS circuits are more
than the conventional CMOS based circuits, the overall Power Delay Product (PDP) of
MTJ/CMOS and CMOS based cryptographic module are comparable. For example, PDP
of one round of MTJ/CMOS based PRESENT-80 is 4% lower than the CMOS based im-
plementation of PRESENT-80. Further, usage of MTJ in MTJ/CMOS circuits has several
advantages such as high density, non-volatility and lower leakage compared to the CMOS
based implementation.
5.5 Security Evaluation of MTJ/CMOS logic based PRESENT
S-box
This section discusses the security evaluation of the MTJ/CMOS circuits. Security eval-
uation is performed by performing a DPA attack on the PRESENT S-box built using the
MTJ/CMOS circuits and CMOS circuits using the steps described in Chapter 2. In this
dissertation, we simulated the S-box circuit at 50 MHz where the period of each clock cor-
responds to 20ns. We have sampled the current traces with a time period of 4ps. So, each
input plain text corresponds to 5000 measured points.
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Figure 5.12: Current consumption of the CMOS and MTJ/CMOS implementation of
PRESENT S-box.
5.5.1 Test case for MTJ/CMOS based S-box circuit
In our test case, the key was chosen to be (6)10. A correlation co-efficient based DPA attack
was performed on PRESENT-80 S-box circuit implemented using MTJ/CMOS circuit and
conventional CMOS based PRESENT-80 S-box circuit. Test circuit consists of four XOR
gates performing Add Round Key operation and the PRESENT-80 based S-box circuit to-
gether. In the real life DPA attacks, a large number (greater than 100,000 plain texts) of
input plain texts are fed to the cryptographic processor. However, we are performing the
simulation based DPA attack without any electrical noises. Moreover, test chip was not a
full chip with other analog and digital modules of the crypto processor that consume ad-
ditional current. So, for our CMOS based S-box circuit, the secret key was revealed using
only 14 power traces. We have to note, that the electrical noises present in the chip increases
the number of traces required to break the crypto processor. For our test case simulations,
we consider the ideal environment (without noise) for an attacker to perform DPA attack.
The same environment has been used to perform DPA attack in MTJ/CMOS circuits. Fig-
ure 5.12 shows the uniform current flowing in the MTJ/CMOS based PRESENT-80 S-box
circuit while non-uniform current flowing in the CMOS based PRESENT-80 S-box circuit.
Figure 5.13 shows the successful DPA attack on PRESENT-80 S-box circuit imple-
mented using the CMOS based S-box circuit. It has to be noted that the successful DPA
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Figure 5.13: A successful DPA attack on PRESENT S-box implemented using conven-
tional CMOS logic gates with key=06.
Figure 5.14: An unsuccessful DPA attack on PRESENT S-box implemented using
MTJ/CMOS circuit with key=06.
attack on CMOS based PRESENT S-box circuit is due to the correlation between the input
data and the power traces. Figure 5.14 shows the unsuccessful DPA attack after 16,000
power traces. The unsuccessful DPA attack on MTJ/CMOS based PRESENT S-box circuit
is due to the uniform power consumption of the MTJ/CMOS circuit irrespective of the in-
put data transitions. It has to be noted that in our simulations, XOR gate in the MTJ/CMOS
implementation of PRESENT-80 is implemented using the MTJ/CMOS XOR gate where
the key is stored in the MTJ devices.
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5.6 Summary
In this chapter, we have explored the usefulness of designing MTJ/CMOS based crypto-
graphic circuits and evaluated its resilience against the DPA attack. MTJ/CMOS circuits
consume uniform power if there is no switching of MTJ devices. We have investigated the
novel approach of building cryptographic hardware in MTJ/CMOS circuits using Look-Up
Table (LUT) based approach where the data stored in MTJs are constant during the entire
encryption/decryption operation. As a case study, we have implemented a S-box circuit and
one round of the PRESENT-80 lightweight cryptographic algorithm using Look-Up Table
(LUT) method. From our simulations, we found that the MTJ/CMOS based PRESENT-
80 is resistant against DPA attack. Further, PRESENT-80 S-box circuit and one round
of PRESENT-80 implemented using MTJ/CMOS circuit saves up to 26% of power and
29% of energy compared to the CMOS based implementation, respectively. The Low-
energy and DPA resistant property along with high density and low-leakage make hybrid
MTJ/CMOS circuits to become a suitable candidate for building non-volatile, low-energy
and compact embedded cryptographic hardware modules which can be resistant against
DPA attack.
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Chapter 6
Energy-Efficient Design of MTJ/CMOS
Logic for DPA Secure Hardware
Hybrid MTJ/CMOS-based Logic-in-Memory (LiM) architecture-based circuits show high
potential in designing low-power circuits by reducing the leakage power. Currently, high
supply voltage (Vdd) is required in both writing and sensing operations of LiM circuits,
which consumes considerable amount of energy. In order to meet the power budget in low-
power electronic devices, scaling down of Vdd is used as an effective method to reduce the
dynamic power consumption. However, scaling down of Vdd leads to increase in leakage
power. Furthermore, the effectiveness of Vdd scaling has declined at a point where further
reduction in Vdd leads to incorrect circuit operation or decrease in energy efficiency of the
circuits. In this chapter, we propose a novel energy-efficient and Secure MTJ/CMOS Logic
(SMCL) circuits to design ultra-low-power MTJ/CMOS circuits. Similar to the existing
MTJ/CMOS designs, the proposed MTJ/CMOS design also works in two different modes
of clock. The proposed MTJ/CMOS designs have considerable power savings during the
pre-charge of the clock. During the pre-charge phase, both output nodes are pre-charged to
Vdd/2, while during the evaluate phase, one node will be charged to VDD, while the other
node will discharged to ground. Moreover, the proposed SMCL consumes uniform power
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Figure 6.1: Schematic of the proposed SMCL based XOR gate.
by masking the MTJ during the write operation from the power supply thereby thwarting
the power analysis based side-channel attacks.
6.1 Proposed Secure MTJ/CMOS Logic (SMCL) circuits
This section explains the operation of the proposed Secure MTJ/CMOS Logic (SMCL) cir-
cuits. In the proposed SMCL circuit, the MTJ’s are masked from the power supply during
the data are written to the MTJ. If the MTJ value is not changed, then both PCSA and SMCL
circuits will consume uniform power. However, our proposed SMCL based MTJ/CMOS
logic gates are more energy-efficient than the existing PCSA based MTJ/CMOS logic gates.
6.1.1 Operation of the proposed SMCL circuit
This section explains the operation of the proposed SMCL circuit. The circuit operation
of the proposed SMCL circuit is explained by the operation of an XOR gate. Figure 6.1
shows the schematic diagram of the proposed SMCL based XOR gate. Transistor MP1 is
used to disconnect the MTJ from Vdd when the data is written in it. Transistors MP2, MP3,
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Figure 6.2: Transient analysis of the proposed SMCL based XOR gate.
MN1 and MN2 are used to stabilize the outputs. Transistors MP4 and MP5 are used for
charge sharing between the output nodes.
The operation of the proposed SMCL circuit is explained with the example of XOR
gate through each phase of the clock.
Charge-sharing phase: During the charge-sharing phase, CLK=0, CLK=1. When
CLK=0, transistor MP4 and MP5 will be turned ON. Since, the proposed SMCL XOR
gate is dual rail in nature, the outputs will be shared between the output nodes during the
charge-sharing phase. During the charge-sharing phase, MP1 is turned OFF to mask the
MTJ while writing the data in the MTJ’s. Moreover, in the proposed SMCL circuits, the
outputs are precharged to Vdd/2 unlike the conventional PCSA MTJ/CMOS circuit where
the outputs are precharged to Vdd. Since, the outputs are precharged to Vdd/2, the proposed
SMCL circuits consume low power compared to the existing PCSA based MTJ/CMOS
circuits.
Evaluate phase: During the evaluate phase, CLK=1, CLK=0. In this phase, transistor
MP1 and MN3 will be turned ON and MP4 and MP5 will be turned OFF. For analysis, let us
assume that the input A=0, B=1. When A=0, transistor T2 and T3 will be turned OFF while
T1 and T4 will be turned ON. The resistance of MTJ1 will be less as compared to resistance
of MTJ2. When CLK=1, the charge stored in XNOR output will be discharged to ground
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Figure 6.3: Current consumption of the proposed SMCL based XOR gate.
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Figure 6.4: Schematic of the proposed SMCL AND gate.
through T1 and MTJ2 which makes transistor MN2 to turn OFF. Since, the transistor MN2
is turned OFF, the XOR output will be charged to Vdd. The transient waveforms of the
proposed SMCL XOR gate is shown in Figure 6.2. Figure 6.3 shows the uniform current
consumption of the proposed SMCL XOR gate. Figure 6.4 shows the schematic of the
proposed SMCL AND gate.
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Figure 6.5: Schematic of the proposed SMCL based full adder circuit
6.1.2 Proposed MTJ/CMOS full adder circuit
Figure 6.5 shows the schematic of the proposed SMCL based Magnetic Full Adder (MFA).
The inputs for the full adder are “A”, “B” and “Cin” and the outputs are SUM and Cout.
In the proposed magnetic full adder circuit, MP1 to MP8 and MN1 to MN4 are used as
the sense amplifier. MP0 is used to mask the MTJ during the write operation. Rest of the
transistors are used for evaluating SUM and Cout outputs. The MOS tree structure of the
ERLIM based magnetic full adder is based on the following equations:
Sum = A.B.Cin+B.A.Cin+ A.B.Cin+ A.Cin.B (6.1)
Cout = A.B + A.Cin+B.Cin (6.2)
Let us assume that B=“1” and B=“0” and A=1 and Cin=1. At T1 phase of the CLK, all
the inputs are passed to the circuit and the non-volatile data is stored in the MTJs. At T2
phase of the CLK, the inputs are evaluated by the CMOS logic tree. For A=1 and Cin=1,
Sum will be discharged faster through the transistors T1 and T3. and SUM output will
be charged to Vdd. Similarly, Cout will be discharged to ground through T9 transistor and
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Cout will be charged to Vdd. At T3 phase of the CLK, the outputs will be hold. At T4,
CLK slowly decrease from Vdd to gnd. So, the charge stored at the SUM and Cout will be
recovered back to CLK.
6.1.3 Theoretical analysis of energy consumption in the proposed SMCL
circuit
This section theoretically analyze the energy consumption in the proposed SMCL circuit
with the existing PCSA based MTJ/CMOS circuit. For analysis lets consider the PCSA
based MTJ/CMOS XOR gate and the proposed SMCL based XOR gate (Figure 6.1).
Energy consumption in PCSA based MTJ/CMOS XOR gate
The energy dissipated to charge a capacitor is given by,
Ediss =
1
2
CV 2dd (6.3)
where, C is the capacitance value and Vdd is the voltage swing.
During the pre-charge phase of the CLK, both XOR and XNOR outputs are charged to
Vdd. Assuming that one of the ouput will be charged to Vdd in the previous cycle, the total
energy dissipated to charge the load capacitors is given by.
Ediss,pre−charge =
1
2
CV 2dd (6.4)
Similarly during the evaluate phase of the CLK, one of the two outputs (XOR or XNOR)
will be discharged to ground while the other output will be at Vdd. So, the energy dissipated
during the evaluate phase of the CLK is given by,
Ediss,eval =
1
2
CV 2dd (6.5)
105
So, the total energy dissipated in one clock cycle of the PCSA based MTJ/CMOS XOR
gate is given by,
Ediss,PCSA = Ediss,pre−charge + Ediss,eval (6.6)
Ediss,PCSA = CV
2
dd (6.7)
The total energy dissipated in one clock cycle of the PCSA based MTJ/CMOS XOR
gate is given as CV 2dd.
Energy consumption in proposed SMCL XOR gate
Let us assume that one of the outputs are already charged to Vdd during the previous cycle.
During the charge sharing phase of the proposed SMCL XOR gate (Figure 6.1), output
voltages will be pre-charge to Vdd/2. During this phase, the charge and voltage are divided
equally between the two load capacitors (XOR and XNOR). So, the total energy dissipated
in the charge sharing phase of the proposed SMCL XOR gate is given by,
Ediss,charge−sharing =
1
4
CV 2dd (6.8)
Similarly during the evaluate phase of the CLK, one of the two outputs (XOR or XNOR)
will be discharged to ground while the other output will be charged to Vdd. So, the energy
dissipated during the evaluate phase of the CLK is given by,
Ediss,eval =
1
2
C(Vdd/2)
2 +
1
2
C(Vdd/2)
2 (6.9)
Ediss,eval =
1
4
CV 2dd (6.10)
So, the total energy dissipated in one clock cycle of the proposed SMCL XOR gate is
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given by,
Ediss,proposed = Ediss,charge−sharing + Ediss,eval (6.11)
Ediss,proposed =
1
2
CV 2dd (6.12)
The total energy dissipated in one clock cycle of the proposed SMCL XOR gate is given
as 0.5CV 2dd which is 50% less than the existing PCSA based MTJ/CMOS XOR gate.
Table 6.1: Performance comparison of PCSA based XOR gate and proposed SMCL XOR
gate.
PCSA based XOR [22] Proposed SMCL XOR gate % impr.
Avg. energy (fJ) 3.604 1.871 50
Avg. power (nW) 40.34 23.1 42.7
Device count 11MOS +2MTJ 12MOS+2MTJ -
Table 6.2: Performance comparison of PCSA based AND gate and proposed SMCL AND
gate.
PCSA based AND [22] Proposed SMCL AND gate % impr.
Avg. energy (fJ) 3.414 1.768 50
Avg. power (nW) 38.24 21.37 44.11
Device count 10MOS +2MTJ 12MOS+2MTJ -
Table 6.3: Performance comparison of PCSA based full adder and proposed full adder
circuit.
PCSA based full
adder [22]
Proposed SMCL full
adder % impr.
Avg. energy (fJ) 115.4 60.84 47.27
Avg. power (nW) 360.5 208.9 42.05
Device count 25MOS +4MTJ 26MOS+2MTJ -
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Table 6.4: Simulated and calculated results for XOR gate for various DPA-resistant adia-
batic logic families.
Logic family PCSA based XOR gate Proposed XOR gate
Emin(fJ) 2.9 1.431
Emax(fJ) 6.3 1.85
NED (%) 69.3 2.63
NSD(%) 61.27 1.23
Table 6.5: Simulated and calculated results for AND gate for various DPA-resistant adia-
batic logic families.
Logic family PCSA based AND gate Proposed SMCL AND gate
Emin(fJ) 2.77 1.25
Emax(fJ) 6.56 2.9
NED (%) 75.2 5.4
NSD(%) 64.33 3.22
6.2 Simulation results of SMCL based Logic Gates
This section presents the simulation results of the proposed SMCL circuits. Simulations are
performed using Cadence Spectre simulator with 45nm standard CMOS technology with
perpendicular anisotropy CoFeB/MgO MTJ model. The MTJ device parameters used for
simulations in this work are shown in Table 5.3 [83]. The simulations are performed at 50
MHz with Vdd=0.9V and load capacitor is 1fF.
The size of all the transistors are W/L=120nm/45nm. Table 6.1 gives the comparison
of the PCSA based XOR gate and the proposed SMCL XOR gate. From Table 6.1, we can
see that the proposed SMCL XOR gate has 50% energy savings compared to the existing
PCSA based XOR gate which is same as the results obtained in theoretical analysis in
Section 6.1.3.
Table 6.2 shows the comparison of the PCSA based AND gate and the proposed AND
gate. From Table 6.2, we can see that the proposed SMCL AND gate has 42.7% and
50% of power and energy savings compared to the existing PCSA based AND gate. From
Table 6.3, we can see that the proposed SMCL based FA consumes 47.27% less energy
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consumption as compared to the existing PCSA based FA.
6.2.1 Security metrics analysis of the MTJ/CMOS gates
This section discusses the security metric analysis of the MTJ/CMOS gates. The parameter
Normalized Energy Deviation (NED), defined as (Emax − Emin)/Emax, is used to indi-
cate the percentage difference between minimum and maximum energy consumption for
all possible input transitions. Normalized Standard Deviation (NSD) indicates the energy
consumption variation based on the inputs and it is calculated as σE
Ē
. Ē denotes the average
energy dissipation for various input transitions. In general, ’n’ input gate will have 22n
possible input transitions. For example, 2 input gates will have 16 input transitions. σE
denotes the standard deviation of the energy dissipated by the circuit and it is given by
σ =
√∑n
i=1(Ei−Ē)2
n
.
From Table 6.4 and Table 6.5, we can see that the NED and NSD values for the proposed
SMCL circuit is very less than the existing PCSA based MTJ/CMOS circuit. Lower the
values of NED and NSD, higher the resilience of the circuit towards power analysis attack.
6.3 Analysis of SMCL based PRESENT-80 cryptographic
hardware
This section discusses the energy-efficiency and security analysis of the proposed SMCL
based PRESENT-80 cryptographic hardware. MTJ/CMOS logic circuits are not energy-
efficient compared to the CMOS based logic circuit when data stored in MTJs toggle [62].
As proposed in Chapter 5, we have used the Look Up Table (LUT) method to implement
PRESENT-80 cryptographic hardware in proposed SMCL logic.
Figure 6.6 shows the sense amplifier circuit to read the data stored in MTJ. Figure 6.6
(a) shows the existing PCSA based sense amplifier and Figure 6.6 (b) shows the proposed
SMCL based sense amplifier circuit. As discussed in previous section, SMCL based circuit
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Figure 6.6: a) PCSA based sense amplifier, b) Proposed SMCL based sense amplifier cir-
cuit.
are more energy-efficient than the PCSA based circuit due to pre-charging the output nodes
to Vdd/2. So, in order to have charge sharing, we increase the width MP3 and MP4 to 6
times than the other PMOS transistors (refer Figure 6.6 (b)). As we know, increasing the
width of transistors reduces the resistance which helps to charge share the output nodes
fast.
Figure 6.7 shows the transient waveforms of the PRESENT-S-box circuit implemented
using the proposed SMCL logic based sense amplifier circuit. The MTJs in the SMCL
based PRESENT-80 S-box circuit are used to store the S-box data while the CMOS logic is
used to choose the corresponding data from the MTJ. SMCL based sense amplifier is used
to read the data stored in the MTJs. As discussed in previous section, SMCL based circuits
pre-charge the output nodes to Vdd/2 which improves its energy-efficiency compared to
existing PCSA based circuits. In Figure 6.7, X0, X1, X2, and X3 represent the input to
the S-box while S0, S1, S2, and S3 represent the corresponding output of the SMCL based
PRESENT-80 S-box circuit.
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Figure 6.7: Transient waveforms of the PRESENT S-Box circuit implemented using pro-
posed SMCL logic based sense amplifier.
6.3.1 Energy-Efficiency analysis of SMCL based PRESENT-80 cryp-
tographic hardware
This section presents the energy-efficiency analysis of the SMCL based PRESENT-80 cryp-
tographic hardware. We initially implemented a PRESENT-80 S-box circuit using the ex-
isting state-of-art PCSA based MTJ/CMOS circuit (refer chapter 5) and proposed SMCL
based circuits. Further, we have also implemented CMOS based PRESENT-80 S-box cir-
cuit to compare its energy-efficiency with the proposed SMCL based PRESENT-80 S-box
circuit. In order to characterize the CMOS and MTJ/CMOS designs in equivalent condi-
tion, 32 D Flip-Flops are added to CMOS based one round of PRESENT-80 cryptographic
hardware to synchronize the outputs with clock signal as PCSA based MTJ/CMOS cir-
cuits are naturally synchronized. Further, it has to be noted that in our MTJ/CMOS based
PRESENT S-box design, data are written only one time. Once the data are written in the
S-box circuit, there is no need to flip the data stored in the MTJs. The constant storage
of data in MTJs without toggling helps in improving the overall energy-efficiency of the
MTJ/CMOS circuits.
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Table 6.6: Energy consumption comparison of PRESENT-80 S-box circuit.
Implementation Energy/cycle Avg. Power Energy savings
PCSA based MTJ/CMOS 24.3 fJ 1.23 µW 45%
CMOS 32.4 fJ 1.72 µW 59%
Proposed SMCL based MTJ/CMOS 13.4 fJ 0.74 µW -
Table 6.6 shows the energy consumption comparison of the PRESENT-80 S-box circuit
implemented using PCSA based MTJ/CMOS, conventional CMOS circuit and proposed
SMCL based MTJ/CMOS circuit. From the table, we can see that the proposed SMCL
based MTJ/CMOS implementation of PRESENT-80 S-box circuit saves up to 59% of en-
ergy as compared to the conventional CMOS based PRESENT-80 S-box circuit. Moreover,
the proposed SMCL based MTJ/CMOS based PRESENT-80 S-box circuit saves up to 45%
of energy/cycle.
Table 6.7: Energy consumption comparison of PRESENT-80 cryptographic hardware.
Implementation Energy/cycle Avg. Power Energy savings
PCSA based MTJ/CMOS 402.96 fJ 20.65 µW 42.18%
Conventional CMOS 566.8 fJ 28.336 µW 59%
Proposed SMCL based MTJ/CMOS 232.96 fJ 12.65 µW -
Further, in this research, we have also implemented one round of PRESENT-80 cryp-
tographic hardware with the proposed SMCL based MTJ/CMOS circuit. Table 6.7 shows
the energy consumption comparison of the PRESENT-80 cryptographic hardware imple-
mented using PCSA based MTJ/CMOS, conventional CMOS based circuits and proposed
SMCL based MTJ/CMOS. From our simulations, we can see that the proposed SMCL
based MTJ/CMOS saves up to 42.18% of energy as compared to the PCSA based MTJ/CMOS
circuits. Further, SMCL based MTJ/CMOS PRESENT-80 cryptographic hardware saves
up to 59% of energy as compared to the conventional CMOS based PRESENT-80 crypto-
graphic hardware.
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Figure 6.8: Current consumption of the CMOS, proposed SMCL based MTJ/CMOS and
PCSA based MTJ/CMOS implementation of PRESENT S-Box.
6.3.2 Security analysis of SMCL based PRESENT-80 cryptographic
hardware
This section presents the security analysis of the SMCL based PRESENT-80 cryptographic
hardware. Figure 6.8 shows the current consumption of the PRESENT-80 S-box circuit
implemented using conventional CMOS circuits, proposed SMCL based MTJ/CMOS cir-
cuits and PCSA based MTJ/CMOS circuits. From the Figure 6.8, we can see that the
conventional CMOS based PRESENT-80 S-box circuit had non-uniform power consump-
tion which makes it susceptible to DPA attack. In this research, we have used the look-
up table based method (refer Chapter 5) to implement the cryptographic circuit using
MTJ/CMOS circuit. From Figure 6.8, we can see that the proposed SMCL MTJ/CMOS
based PRESENT-80 S-box circuit has reduced uniform current consumption compared
to the PCSA MTJ/CMOS based PRESENT-80 S-box circuit. Figure 6.9 shows the non-
successful DPA attack on the proposed SMCL based PRESENT-80 S-box circuit with
key=06.
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Figure 6.9: A non-successful DPA attack on PRESENT S-box implemented using proposed
SMCL logic with key=06.
6.4 Summary
In this chapter, we have proposed energy-efficient Secure MTJ/CMOS logic family. The
proposed MTJ/CMOS logic is energy-efficient compared to the existing PCSA based MTJ/CMOS
by pre-charging the output nodes to Vdd/2. Further, we have implemented a PRESENT-80
lightweight cryptographic hardware using the proposed SMCL logic. From our simula-
tions, we observed that the proposed SMCL based PRESENT-80 cryptographic hardware
has about 42% and 59% of energy savings compared to the PCSA based MTJ/CMOS and
conventional CMOS based implementation, respectively. Further, we have also performed
the DPA attack on the SMCL based PRESENT-80 and the secret key was not revealed af-
ter 16000 power traces. The low-energy and DPA resistant property makes the proposed
SMCL logic a suitable circuit design technique suitable for low-power non-volatile mem-
ory based IoT devices.
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Chapter 7
Adiabatic Logic Based Energy Efficient
and Reliable PUF for IoT devices
Apart from Differential Power Analysis (DPA) based side-channel attack on IoT devices,
authentication and piracy also needs to be addressed [48]. It is expected that there will be
more than 50 billion IoT devices in the real world market. Further, most of the IoT devices
are deployed in places where less human operators are sitting behind. So, these devices
must be capable of identifying and authenticating themselves. The second concern for the
IoT devices is the cloning attack. IoT devices are deployed in open. An attacker may easily
access an IoT device and extract the secret keys to clone the device. Currently, the secret
keys used for authentication are stored in non-volatile memories. However, the secret keys
are vulnerable to active attacks [48], [4], [40]. Moreover, implementing a tamper resistant
circuitry in IoT devices to provide high level physical security may be very expensive in
terms of cost and energy. Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) are a class of circuits
that use the inherent variations in an Integrated Circuit (IC) manufacturing process to cre-
ate unique and unclonable IDs. PUFs have shown great promise for generating secure key
generation for the cryptographic hardware in an inexpensive way. However, designing a
reliable PUF along with energy-efficiency is a big challenge. In this chapter, we propose
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Figure 7.1: Schematic of the proposed adiabatic logic based PUF cell.
a novel energy-efficient adiabatic logic based PUF structure for energy-efficiency and reli-
able key generation. The proposed adiabatic PUF uses energy recovery concept to achieve
high energy efficiency and uses the time ramp voltage to exhibit the reliable start-up be-
havior.
7.1 Proposed adiabatic logic based PUF
Time ramp voltages are used in adiabatic logic technique to recover the energy from each
node of the circuit. In this chapter, we propose a novel adiabatic logic based PUF that uti-
lizes the unique property of adiabatic computing of having time ramp voltages to improve
the energy efficiency as well as reliability. Figure 7.1 shows the schematic of the proposed
adiabatic logic based PUF cell. The proposed adiabatic PUF cells consists of the cross
coupled inverter (M1, M2, M3 and M4) similar to the memory based PUF. Further, the
proposed adiabatic PUF cell also consists of a sleep transistor to enable or disable the PUF
cell. When enable/disable is “1”, the adiabatic PUF cell will be at the idle state (no oper-
ation will be performed). Figure 7.2 shows the time ramp voltage or the power clock (Vpc)
voltage which is used to charge and discharge the output nodes in the proposed adiabatic
PUF cell.
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Figure 7.2: Time ramp voltage or power clock (Vpc) which is used in the proposed adiabatic
PUF cell.
7.1.1 Operation of the proposed adiabatic logic based PUF cell
The operation of the proposed adiabatic logic based PUF cell through different phases of
the clock (wait, evaluate, hold and recover) is explained below. Let us assume that disable
is “0”, so the MN0 transistor will be turned ON for the whole operation.
Wait Phase
During the wait phase, power clock (Vpc) will be at gnd. So, the PUF cell will be at idle
state at this phase.
Evaluate phase
During the evaluate phase of Vpc, the Vpc will slowly rise from gnd to Vdd. When Vpc starts
rising from gnd, both M1 and M2 transistors starts conducting. Due to the imperfections in
the manufacturing process, both the transistors will have different threshold voltages. The
transistor which has the lower threshold voltage conducts the current quickly as compared
to the other and the corresponding load capacitor will quickly get charged. This leads to
the flip in the outputs where one of the outputs leads to logic “1” and other to logic “0”.
For example, let us assume that the threshold voltage of M2 is greater than the threshold
voltage of M1. Since the threshold voltage of M2 is greater than M1, the resistance of
M2 will be greater than M1. When Vpc is greater than Vtp, both M1 and M2 are turned
ON. Since RM2 > RM1, the output load capacitor will be charged quicker through M1
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Figure 7.3: Operation of the proposed adiabatic PUF during a) Evaluate phase, b) Recover
phase.
compared to out load capacitor. The operation of the proposed adiabatic logic PUF cell
during the evaluate phase is shown in Figure 7.3 (a).
Hold Phase
During the hold phase of the Vpc, the proposed adiabatic PUF will have stable PUF re-
sponse.
Recover phase
During the recover phase of the clock, the time ramp voltage is slowly reduced from Vdd
to gnd. During this phase, the charge stored in the load capacitor is slowly recovered back
to the power clock generator circuit through the M1 transistor. Figure 7.3 (b) shows the
operation of the proposed adiabatic PUF cell during the recover phase of the clock. Further,
it has to be noted that the redundant voltage will be stored at the out node since M1 will
be turned OFF when Vpc reaches V dd − Vth. However, the redundant voltage (Vtp) will
be useful to bias the PUF cell towards a constant logic“1” or logic “0” in the consecutive
cycle of Vpc.
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(a) 180nm, body=vdd (b) 180nm, body=vpc
(c) 45nm, body=vdd (d) 45nm, body=vpc
Figure 7.4: Inter-chip Hamming distance (HD) variations of the proposed 128 × 100 PUF
at different CMOS technology and with body of PMOS connected to Vdd and Vpc
7.2 Simulation results
To analyze the reproducibility of the proposed adiabatic logic PUF, we have designed and
implemented a 128 bit PUF in a standard 180nm CMOS technology and simulated using
Cadence Spectre simulator. Further, the evaluation of the proposed adiabatic PUF is also
presented in 45nm CMOS technology. Simulation environments and the experiments are
described in this section. Finally, the simulation results are presented.
7.2.1 Proposed PUF response
Each bit of the proposed adiabatic logic based PUF response is generated from the individ-
ual adiabatic logic based PUF cell. The major application of the proposed adiabatic PUF
cell is to generate the key for the cryptographic operations, so we have implemented a 128
bit PUF array. In order to emulate the characterization of 100 IC PUF chips, 100 runs of
Monte-Carlo simulation were performed.
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In our simulations, temperature is varied from -40◦C to 80◦C with 27◦C as the reference
temperature. Further, we have also analyzed the reliability of the proposed adiabatic PUF
by varying the peak power clock voltages by ±20%Vdd.
7.2.2 Simulation environment and experiments
All simulations reported in this dissertation are performed using Cadence Spectre simulator.
The transient noise is added through the simulation tool. The following parameters are
considered for the proposed adiabatic PUF.
Body effect
In order to consider the body effect, we have simulated all the designs by connecting the
body of the PMOS to Vdd (constant voltage) and to Vpc (power clock).
Temperature variation
In order to consider the temperature variations, we have varied the temperature from -
40◦C to 80◦C. Simulations were performed at -40◦C,-20◦C,0◦C,20◦C,27◦C,40◦C,60◦C, and
80◦C.
Supply variation
We have varied the supply voltage variation by ±20% of the peak voltage of Vpc.
Technology parameters
In this work, we have considered the variation of PUF metrics by simulating the circuits at
two different technology nodes. The channel lengths of the transistors play a major role in
controlling manufacturing variations. So, in this research, we consider 180nm CMOS tech-
nology (long-channel) and 45nm CMOS technology (short-channel) to analyze the impact
120
of channel length variations. In first case, we presented all the values at 180nm CMOS tech-
nology and in the second case, we presented the PUF metrics when the circuit is simulated
with 45nm CMOS technology.
Table 7.1: Simulated and calculated results of uniqueness(%) for the proposed 128 × 100
adiabatic PUF.
Technology Body HDinter−mean uniqueness(%)
180nm Vdd 64.0721 49.5607
180nm Vpc 64.1154 49.5706
45nm Vdd 63.9743 49.4796
45nm Vpc 63.9727 49.4839
7.2.3 Simulation results and analysis
The simulation results and the analysis are presented in this section.
Uniqueness
Figure 7.4 shows the inter-chip Hamming Distance (HD) of the proposed 128 × 100 adia-
batic PUF at 180nm CMOS technology and 45nm CMOS technology. Figure 7.4 (a) and
(b) shows the inter chip HD of the proposed adiabatic PUF at 180nm CMOS technology
with the body of PMOS connected to Vdd and Vpc respectively. Similarly, Figure 7.4 (c) and
(d) shows the inter chip HD of the proposed adiabatic PUF at 45nm CMOS technology with
the body of PMOS connected to Vdd and Vpc respectively. For the calculation purposes, we
use the read response values of the proposed adiabatic PUF at the end of recovery phase.
Based on the responses collected from 100 PUF instances, with each providing 128 bits,
the mean inter chip HD value (HDinter−mean)of the proposed 128 × 100 adiabatic PUF at
180nm CMOS technology when the body is connected to Vdd is 64.0721 while when the
body is connected to Vpc,HDinter−mean value is 64.1154. Similarly,HDinter−mean value of
the proposed adiabatic PUF with the body connected to Vdd and Vpc is 63.9745 and 63.9727
respectively.
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Figure 7.5: Gray scale bitmap showing the response of the proposed 128 × 100 adiabatic
PUF at 180nm CMOS technology when the body of the PMOS devices connected to a) Vdd
and b)Vpc. Black pixel represents bit 0 and white pixel represents bit 1.
From the simulation results and calculations, we found that the uniqueness value of
the proposed 128 × 100 adiabatic PUF at 180nm CMOS technology with body of PMOS
connected to Vdd is 49.5607% and to Vpc is 49.5706%. Similarly, the uniqueness value of
the proposed 128 × 100 adiabatic PUF at 45nm CMOS technology with body of PMOS
connected to Vdd is 49.4796% to Vpc is 49.4839%. The ideal value of uniqueness is 50%.
Table 7.1 summarizes the uniqueness result of the proposed adiabatic PUF at different
CMOS technology.
Uniformity
Figures 7.5 (a) and (b) show the gray scale bit map image of the proposed 128 × 100
adiabatic PUF simulated at 180nm with body of the PMOS connected to Vdd and Vpc re-
spectively. Similarly, Figures 7.6 (a) and (b) show the gray scale bit map image of the
proposed 128 bit adiabatic PUF with 100 instances simulated at 45nm CMOS technology
with body of the PMOS connected to Vdd and Vpc respectively. From the simulation results
and calculations, the uniformity of the proposed adiabatic PUF at 180nm CMOS technol-
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Figure 7.6: Gray scale bitmap showing the response of the proposed 128 × 100 adiabatic
PUF at 45nm technology when the body of the PMOS devices connected to a) Vdd and b)
Vpc. Black pixel represents bit 0 and white pixel represents bit 1.
ogy with the body of PMOS connected to Vdd is 49.7%. The uniformity of the proposed
adiabatic PUF at 180nm CMOS technology with the body of PMOS connected to Vpc is
49.92%. Similarly, the uniformity of the proposed adiabatic PUF at 45nm CMOS technol-
ogy with the body of the PMOS connected to Vdd is 49.45% and the uniformity of the PUF
at 45nm with the body of the PMOS connected to Vpc is 49.41%. As the probability of
generating ones is close to ideal value of 50%, it indicates that the proposed adiabatic PUF
output is not predictable and makes it hard to attack. Table 7.2 shows the uniformity results
of the proposed adiabatic PUF with different configurations.
Table 7.2: Simulated and calculated results of uniformity(%) for the proposed 128 × 100
adiabatic PUF.
Technology Body uniformity(%)
180nm Vdd 49.7
180nm Vpc 49.92
45nm Vdd 49.45
45nm Vpc 49.41
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Reliability
We have evaluated the reliability of the proposed adiabatic PUF by varying the temperature
from -40◦C to 80◦C with 27◦C as the reference temperature. Further we also evaluated
the variation of supply voltage by varying the peak power clock voltage by Vdd±20%Vdd.
Figure 7.7 shows reliability of the proposed adiabatic PUF against temperature variations
for all the configurations of the proposed adiabatic PUF simulated at 180nm and 45nm
CMOS technology.
Reliability of proposed PUF at 180nm CMOS technology: The average reliability of
the proposed 128 bit adiabatic PUF with 100 instances at 180nm CMOS technology with
body of PMOS connected to Vdd is 97.7511% while with body of PMOS connected to Vpc
is 98.2109%. The worst case reliability of the proposed adiabatic PUF at 180nm CMOS
technology when the body is connected to Vdd and Vpc is 96.3750% at 80◦C and 96.8438 at
80◦C respectively. Table 7.3 summarizes the average reliability of the proposed adiabatic
PUF at different CMOS technologies and at different configurations.
Reliability of proposed PUF at 45nm CMOS technology: The average reliability
of the proposed 128 bit adiabatic PUF with 100 instances at 45nm CMOS technology
with body of PMOS connected to Vdd is 99.5368%, while with body of PMOS connected
to Vpc is 99.7588%. The worst case reliability for the proposed adiabatic PUF at 45nm
CMOS technology when the body is connected to Vdd and Vpc is 99.3281% at 60◦C and
99.6016% at -40◦C respectively. From our simulations and calculations, it is concluded that
the proposed adiabatic PUF at 45nm CMOS technology has high reliability as compared to
the 180nm CMOS technology.
Reliability of proposed PUF against supply voltage variations: Further, we have also
evaluated the reliability of the proposed adiabatic PUF against supply voltage variations.
The 100 PUF instances were simulated under different supply voltages from 0.8 to 1.2
V for 45nm CMOS technology and 1.6 to 2 V for 180nm CMOS technology and at three
different temperatures, -40◦C, 27◦C, and 80◦C. Reading the responses at the supply voltage
124
Table 7.3: Simulated and calculated results of average and worst case reliability(%) of the
proposed 128× 100 adiabatic PUF against temperature variations.
Technology Body Average (%) worst case (%)
180nm Vdd 97.7511 96.3750
180nm Vpc 98.2109 96.8438
45nm Vdd 99.5368 99.3281
45nm Vpc 99.7588 99.6016
of 1.8 V for 180nm technology and 1 V for 45nm technology as reference, Bit Error Rate
(BER) is calculated. Reliability can also calculated as be expressed in terms of Bit Error
Rate (BER).
BER is expressed as,
BER% = 100−Reliability% (7.1)
Figures 7.8 (a) and (b) shows the BER of the proposed 128 bit adiabatic PUF when sim-
ulated at 180nm CMOS technology with body connected to Vdd and Vpc respectively. From
the simulation results, we found that the worst case BER for 180nm CMOS technology
is less than 6.2% and 6% when the body of PMOS connected to Vdd and Vpc respectively.
Similarly, Figure 7.9 (a) and (b) shows the BER of the proposed 128 bit adiabatic PUF
when simulated at 45nm CMOS technology with body connected to Vdd and Vpc. From our
simulation results, we found that the worst case BER is less than 0.36% when the body is
connected to Vdd while the BER is less than 0.42% when the body is connected to Vdd and
Vpc respectively.
Energy consumption
Energy consumption is a very important parameter in the design of resource constrained
devices. Table 7.4 provides the energy consumption comparison of the proposed adiabatic
PUF along with the state-of-art PUFs. From Table 7.4, we can see that the proposed adi-
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Figure 7.7: Reliability of the proposed adiabatic PUF with the change in temperature at
different technology nodes and with body effect.
(a) (b)
Figure 7.8: Bit Error Rate (BER) of the proposed adiabatic PUF with the supply voltage
variation at 180nm CMOS technology with PMOS connected to a) Vdd, b) Vpc.
(a) (b)
Figure 7.9: Bit Error Rate (BER) of the proposed adiabatic PUF with the supply voltage
variation at 45nm CMOS technology with PMOS connected to a) Vdd, b) Vpc.
126
abatic PUF is energy efficient as compared to the PUFs listed in the Table 7.4. However,
it has to be noted that the proposed adiabatic PUF has more energy consumption than [59]
because the PUF proposed in [59] is operated at lower technology node and lower voltage
than the proposed adiabatic PUF.
Table 7.4: Energy consumption comparison of the proposed adiabatic PUF with the state-
of-art PUFs.
PUF Tech. Vdd Energy/bit
Lim et. al [41] 180nm 1.8 V 1.37 pJ
Stanzione et. al [67] 90nm 1.2 V 3.8 pJ
Majzoobi et. al [45] 90nm 1.2 V 15 fJ
Cao et. al [16] 180nm 3.3 V 23.9 pJ
Yang et. al [86] 40nm 0.9 V 17.75 pJ
Neale et. al [59] 28nm 0.6 V 0.045 fJ
Tao et. al [71] 65nm 0.6 V 10.3 fJ
Proposed (This work) 180nm 1.8 V 1.071 fJ
Proposed (This work) 45nm 1 V 0.08 fJ
Table 7.5: Security metric comparison of the proposed adiabatic PUF with the state-of-art
PUFs.
PUF Tech. Vdd Uniqu-eness Uniformity
Reliability
(worst
case)
Energy
/bit
Lim et. al [41] 180nm 1.8 V NA NA 95.18% 1.37 pJ
Stanzione et. al [67] 90nm 1.2 V NA NA 99.9% 3.8 pJ
Majzoobi et. al [45] 90nm 1.2 V NA NA 97% 15 fJ
Cao et. al [16] 180nm 3.3 V 49.37 % NA 99.1 % 23.9 pJ
Yang et. al [86] 40nm 0.9 V 47.22 % NA ≥ 99.99 % 17.8 pJ
Neale et. al [59] 28nm 0.6 V 49.11 % 49.96 % 88.39 0.05 fJ
Tao et. al [71] 65nm 0.6 V 50.04 % 49.5 % 98.56 % 10.3 fJ
Proposed (This work) 180nm 1.8 V 49.97 % 49.92 % 96.84 % 1.1 fJ
Proposed (This work) 45nm 1 V 49.48 % 49.41 % 99.60 % 0.08 fJ
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7.3 Discussion
In this research, we have employed adiabatic logic for several reasons to design the PUF
circuit. Adiabatic logic technique is used to achieve low power and low energy consump-
tion compared to the conventional CMOS circuits.
We designed a adiabatic logic based PUF to generate the secure key for the crypto-
graphic systems in IoT devices. However, the reliability of the PUF is an important param-
eter to consider while designing the PUF to generate the reliable keys. Cortez et. al [21] has
reported that intelligent choosing of time ramp up at a particular temperature can improve
the reliability of SRAM PUF cells. However, this technique requires additional circuitry
to perform the intelligent time ramp up operation to improve the reliability of SRAM PUF
cell. Similarly, A. Vijayakumar et al. [80] have proposed a majority voting technique to im-
prove the reliability of the SRAM PUF. However, this technique requires multiple turning
on and turning off of the SRAM cell which results in additional power consumption.
In our adiabatic logic based PUF, time ramp voltages are used to recover the charge
thereby reducing the energy consumption. Moreover, the usage of time ramp voltages is
also used to improve the reliability of the proposed adiabatic PUF as discussed in [21].
The adiabatic clock can be generated as discussed in [6]. Further, it is to be noted that the
adiabatic clock generator circuit will also be used to drive the cryptographic processor in
the circuit to improve the energy-efficiency.
7.3.1 Security metric comparison of proposed adiabatic PUF with state-
of-art PUFs
Table 7.5 provides the security metric comparison with the proposed adiabatic PUF. All the
data reported here are obtained from the corresponding paper. NA in the table represents
data not available. From Table 7.5, we can see that the PUF proposed in [41] using 180nm
technology with 1.8 V has the worst case reliability of 95.18% with 1.37 pJ of energy con-
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sumption per bit. Our proposed adiabatic PUF which is simulated in 180nm technology has
the worst case reliability of 96.84% with the 1.071 fJ of energy consumption per bit per cy-
cle. However, PUF proposed in [17] using 180nm CMOS technology has better worst case
reliability than the proposed adiabatic PUF, while consuming 23.9 pJ of energy/bit. The
PUF proposed in [67] using 90nm CMOS technology has 99.99% of worst case reliability
consuming 3.8pJ/bit of energy. The PUF proposed in [45] using 90nm CMOS technology
has lower reliability than PUF proposed in [67] consuming lower energy.
Similarly, the PUF proposed in [86] has very high reliability of 99.99% but suffers
from high energy consumption which makes it not suitable to implement in IoT devices.
Our proposed adiabatic PUF at 45nm CMOS technology has a worst case reliability of
99.68 % with very low energy consumption. High reliability, low energy consumption and
low implementation cost make the proposed adiabatic PUF a suitable candidate for IoT
devices and medical devices. The proposed adiabatic PUF in 45nm CMOS technology has
more energy consumption than [59] because the PUF proposed in [59] is operated at lower
technology node and lower voltage than the proposed adiabatic PUF. However, reliability
of the PUF in [59] is 88.39% which makes them not suitable to generate reliable key for
IoT devices.
7.4 Summary
A low cost adiabatic logic based CMOS PUF that generates unique and reliable response
bits have been proposed and evaluated. The proposed adiabatic logic based PUF uses the
time ramp voltages to recover the charge from the load capacitor to achieve energy effi-
ciency as well as improve the reliability. From our simulation results, we observed that the
proposed adiabatic PUF at 180nm CMOS technology and 45nm CMOS technology has the
uniqueness and uniformity values close to the ideal value of 50%. The reliability of the
PUF is also verified by varying the temperature from -40◦C to 80◦C and also by varying
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the supply voltage by ±20% Vdd. Moreover, the proposed adiabatic PUF has significant
energy savings as compared to the existing PUFs. Low energy consumption per bit, high
reliability, close to ideal uniqueness and uniformity values make our adiabatic PUF a suit-
able candidate to implement in battery operated IoT devices. Some of the applications of
our proposed PUF include secure key generation, device authentication, memoryless key
storage, Intellectual Property (IP) protection etc.
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Chapter 8
Conclusion and Future Directions
Internet of Things (IoT) is a network of devices that are connected through the Internet to
exchange data for intelligent applications. Though IoT devices provide several advantages
to improve the quality of life, they also equally present challenges related to security and
piracy. The security issues in IoT devices include leakage of information through Differ-
ential Power Analysis (DPA) based side channel attacks, authentication, piracy, etc. Im-
provement in the security of IoT devices comes at the cost of reduction in battery life. IoT
devices are battery operated, therefore this dissertation explores research solutions to hard-
ware security and power consumption problems in IoT devices with novel circuit design
techniques in emerging transistors and non-volatile memories.
Our first contribution is the proposal of a novel DPA-resistant adiabatic logic fam-
ily called Energy-Efficient Secure Positive Feedback Adiabatic Logic (EE-SPFAL). EE-
SPFAL based circuits are energy-efficient compared to the existing DPA-resistant adiabatic
logic achieved by reducing the non-adiabatic energy loss during the switching of input
data. Further, EE-SPFAL based circuits consume uniform power irrespective of input data
transition which makes them resilience against DPA attacks. Along with the low-power cir-
cuit design methodologies, various low-leakage emerging devices have been investigated
to address the power budget issue in IoT devices.
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In the second contribution of this dissertation, we have investigated the usefulness of
FinFET device along with adiabatic logic in the design of DPA secure hardware. As a
result, we have proposed a novel FinFET based Secure Adiabatic Logic (FinSAL) fam-
ily. FinSAL based designs utilize low-leakage FinFET device along with adiabatic logic
principles to improve energy-efficiency along with its resistance against DPA attack.
In the third contribution of this dissertation, we have explored the usefulness of design-
ing MTJ/CMOS based cryptographic circuits and evaluated its resilience against the DPA
attack. As a result we have proposed a novel approach of building cryptographic hard-
ware in MTJ/CMOS circuits using Look-Up Table (LUT) based method where the data
stored in MTJs are constant during the entire encryption/decryption operation. As a case
study, we have implemented a S-box circuit and one round of the PRESENT-80 lightweight
cryptographic algorithm using Look-Up Table (LUT) method. The proposed LUT method
implementation in MTJ/CMOS has improved energy-efficiency and DPA resistance prop-
erty compared to conventional CMOS based designs.
In the fourth contribution of this dissertation, we have proposed a novel energy-efficient
Secure MTJ/CMOS Logic (SMCL) family. The proposed SMCL logic family consumes
uniform power irrespective of data transition in MTJ and more energy-efficient as compared
to the state-of-art MTJ/CMOS designs by using charge sharing technique.
The other important contribution of this dissertation is the design of reliable Physical
Unclonable Function (PUF) using adiabatic logic technique. The time ramp voltages in
adiabatic PUF are utilized to improve the reliability of PUF along with its energy-efficiency.
Reliability of the adiabatic logic based PUF proposed in this dissertation is tested through
simulation based temperature variations and supply voltage variations.
We also presented the low-power design techniques to address the power budget and the
security problems in low-power IoT devices. The results presented in this dissertation have
been obtained using the industry standard CAD tools such as Cadence Virtuoso, Cadence
Assura, etc. As a future work of this research, practical evaluation of the designs will be
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performed on the silicon prototyping. Adiabatic logic technique is a low-power design
technique to design energy-efficient and secure hardware. These circuits utilizes multi-
phase clocking to recover the charge. As a future directions, the proposed circuits can
be integrated with wireless charging circuit in order to design energy-efficient wireless
charging based DPA resistant hardware.
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